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Based on the landmark 1961 Supreme Court decision, Aro
Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., the long
held wisdom in patent law has been that there is no heart or gist of
the invention. In other words, patent law does not attribute any
special significance to a particular subset of claim limitations
regardless of how important those limitations are. Under Aro,
judges and juries are told that they need to view all the limitations,
even stock components, with equal significance. They must resist
focusing on the heart of the invention when making any decision.
Aro’s commandment has spread far beyond the doctrine of
repair and reconstruction, the subject matter of Aro. In fact, it has
become a basic tenet of patent law and has been adopted by the
doctrines of infringement, anticipation, obviousness, and the
written description requirement.
To this day, judges and
commentators continue to cite to Aro and proclaim that patent law
does not recognize the heart of the invention.
This Article challenges the conventional wisdom as neither
accurate nor wise. It is not accurate because other doctrines
unwittingly consider the heart of invention while using different
nomenclature.
For example, the doctrines of contributory
infringement and inequitable conduct do not openly challenge Aro,
yet they rely on the “material part of the invention” and “point of
novelty” respectively. Aro’s commandment is unwise because a
rule against considering the heart of the invention is bad policy.
On a purely intuitive level, it is entirely sensible for judges and
juries to focus on the heart of the invention in making their
decisions. This Article demonstrates why this intuition is correct
by analyzing how different patent law doctrines rightly and
wrongly rely on the heart of invention.
The Article then provides a framework for determining when
the heart of the invention should and should not be considered.
Applying this framework to various areas of patent law, this
Article explains: 1) why the fifty years of jurisprudence in the
doctrine of repair and reconstruction is wrong; 2) why the heart of
the invention may be a permissible consideration in various
developing areas of patent law including subject matter
patentability; and 3) how the Supreme Court got it “almost” right
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in Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., when it decided
that the “essential features” (another pseudonym for the heart of
the invention) was an important consideration within the doctrine
of patent exhaustion.
INTRODUCTION
For almost fifty years, the Supreme Court’s decision in Aro
Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co.1 has been
the foundation for one of the basic commandments in patent law:
there is no legally recognizable heart of an invention in
combination patents.2 In other words, patent law does not attribute
any significance to a subset of claim limitations regardless of how
important those limitations are; it looks at all the limitations
together. Imagine a computer patent that shows how to speed up
the microprocessor. Under Aro, judges and juries are told that they
cannot focus on what makes the microprocessor faster and that
they need to view all the limitations, even stock components (e.g.,
memory, mouse, and display), with equal significance. They must
resist focusing on the heart of the invention when making any
decision. Although Aro’s commandment was only one factor used
to develop a new standard for the doctrine of repair and
reconstruction, it has found its way into numerous other doctrines
in patent law including infringement, anticipation, obviousness,
and the written description requirement. Moreover, Aro continues
to influence the thinking in other developing doctrines.
More recently, the Supreme Court’s decision in Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.3 showed that Aro’s
commandment is not absolute. In Quanta, the Supreme Court
found that the doctrine of patent exhaustion could apply to the sale
of a product even though it does not contain all the elements of the
patented invention.4 So long as the “essential features” are present,

1

365 U.S. 336 (1961).
Id. at 344–45 (“[T]here is no legally recognizable or protected ‘essential’ element,
‘gist’ or ‘heart’ of the invention in a combination patent.”).
3
128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008).
4
See id. at 2120–21 (“The sale of a device that practices patent A does not, by virtue
of practicing patent A, exhaust patent B. But if the device practices patent A while
2
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that is sufficient.5 Thus, unlike Aro, Quanta plainly recognizes
that a subset of key claim limitations (i.e., the heart of the
invention) can have legal significance.
This Article critically explores how different doctrines in
patent law have addressed the heart of the invention, in many cases
using different nomenclature. The issue has arisen in many
contexts beyond the doctrines of repair and reconstruction (Aro)
and exhaustion (Quanta). It cuts a broad swath across patent law.
The doctrines of infringement, anticipation, obviousness, the
written description requirement, contributory infringement,
inequitable conduct, joint inventorship, patentable subject matter,
and enablement have all contemplated whether it is appropriate to
consider the heart of the invention within their particular areas.
After exploring these far ranging doctrines, the author has
come to the surprising conclusion that nearly fifty years of
jurisprudence is wrong in several respects. First, courts and
commentators inaccurately cite to Aro as if it presides over all of
patent law. It does not. The heart of the invention is considered in
several different doctrines, albeit using different nomenclature.
Second, rejecting the heart of the invention in Aro was both bad
jurisprudence and policy. The Supreme Court incorrectly relied on
precedent that had already been legislatively overruled by the
Patent Act of 1952.6
Moreover, subsequent repair and
reconstruction decisions have shown that applying Aro’s standard
can lead to absurd results.
This Article does not recommend a complete reversal of Aro’s
commandment. Rather, it provides an analytical framework for
determining when it is appropriate to reject the heart of the
invention and when it is not. The current framework of making
substantially embodying patent B, its relationship to patent A does not prevent exhaustion
of patent B.”).
5
Id. at 2116–17 (“‘[W]here one has sold an uncompleted article which, because it
embodies essential features of his patented invention, is within the protection of his
patent, and has destined the article to be finished by the purchaser in conformity to the
patent, he has sold his invention so far as it is or may be embodied in that particular
article.’” (quoting United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 250–51 (1942))).
6
See Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 593, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 100–376 (2006)); Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of
Patents, 90 B.U. L. REV. 51, 72 & n.105 (2010); infra note 133 and accompanying text.
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that decision based on the particular label used to describe the
heart of the invention is obviously wrong. The heart of the
invention should not be considered when the law needs to
determine when something falls within the boundaries outlined by
a patent’s claims. In these situations, it is entirely appropriate to
apply what is known as the “all elements” rule. However, the “all
elements” rule is a subtly different concept than the “heart of the
invention.” The former rule recognizes that patent law defines the
property rights of a patent by looking at all its claim limitations.7
In contrast, considering the heart of the invention suggests that
courts should focus on certain “key” claim limitations when
deciding particular issues. When the law is not seeking to
determine when something falls within the boundaries outlined by
a patent’s claim, it may be appropriate to focus on the heart of the
invention.
This framework is useful for two reasons. First, it can identify
when certain existing doctrines have gone wrong. For example,
the doctrine of repair and reconstruction does not assess whether
one patent infringes another.8 Thus, this framework suggests that
the heart of the invention may be a proper consideration there.
Second, a sound framework can help the courts understand when
the heart of the invention should be considered in developing areas
of patent law. Even now, there are several areas in patent law that
are developing; whether the heart of the invention is an appropriate
consideration is still yet to be determined. Just recently, the
Supreme Court implicitly allowed courts to consider the heart of
the invention when determining whether the subject matter of an

7

See Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(noting that the “all elements rule” “holds that an accused product or process is not
infringing unless it contains each limitation of the claim, either literally or by an
equivalent”). The “all elements rule” is sometimes called the “all limitations rule.” See
Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement, and Patent Claim Scope:
A New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1979 (2005).
8
Rather, this doctrine analyzes whether repair of a patented product is so substantial
as to constitute an unlicensed reconstruction of that product. See Leesona Corp. v. United
States, No. 130-70, 1978 WL 14862, at *16 (Ct. Cl. May 1, 1978) (“Under the doctrine of
repair or reconstruction, a device is reconstructed if it takes on the nature of a new
infringing device, whereas, if the device is merely repaired, it does not take on the nature
of a new device.”).
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invention is patentable.9 The heart of the invention has also been
debated in the context of damages and the written description
requirement’s “omitted elements” test and mentioned less
prominently in the context of enablement.10
Part I of this Article defines the “heart of the invention” and
introduces Aro’s commandment: the heart of the invention should
not be considered in patent law. It then explains how this rule has
been inconsistently obeyed. The doctrines of infringement,
anticipation, obviousness, and the written description requirement
follow Aro. But the doctrines of contributory infringement,
inequitable conduct, and joint inventorship consider the heart of
the invention. Yet no one suggests that these doctrines are
inconsistent with Aro’s commandment because the different
doctrines use different terminology. This Part shows how instead
of discussing the heart of the invention, each area of the law uses a
different label to capture the same concept. Finally, Part I
compares the current argument in favor of considering the heart of
the invention to recent thinking about central claiming. Both
arguments attempt to focus the law on the actual invention and
disfavor bright line rules that may detract from that focus.
Part II of this Article critically analyzes Aro and explains that
the majority opinion improperly relied on the Supreme Court’s
earlier Mercoid decisions—decisions that Congress had already
rejected by enacting the Patent Act of 1952.11 What’s more, this
Part argues, Aro did not just interpret precedent wrongly; it is also
bad policy. Aro’s test has led to results that are at odds with
commonsense notions of what repair and reconstruction are.
Part III then outlines an analytical framework for reconciling
how different doctrines treat the heart of the invention and explains
when it makes sense to reject the heart of the invention and when it
does not. The decision turns on the nature and context of the
question being asked. If the doctrine at issue asks whether
something falls within the boundaries protected by a patent, the
heart of the invention should not be considered. Rather, the “all
9
10
11

See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); see infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.B.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text; infra Part II.C.
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elements” rule should apply. However, there are many doctrines
that do not evaluate whether a product or process falls within a
patent’s boundaries. In those cases, courts should be free to
consider the heart of the invention. Part III goes on to apply this
framework to several developing areas of patent law where
scholars are currently examining whether the heart of the invention
is an appropriate consideration. They are patentable subject
matter, the “omitted elements” test, damages, and enablement.
Part IV discusses the recent Quanta decision on exhaustion.
Patent exhaustion and contributory infringement share a similar
question and both appropriately focus on the heart of the invention.
Part IV then acknowledges that Quanta outlined a two-pronged
standard that may be difficult to apply. The author therefore
recommends that the lower courts focus on the contributory
infringement prong because it provides an objective test for
determining when a subset of limitations is “essential.”
I. UNDERSTANDING THE HEART OF THE INVENTION
The term “heart of the invention” gained notoriety in the 1961
Supreme Court case, Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co.12 In this landmark case, the Supreme Court said
that it was improper to consider the heart of the invention in
determining whether the defendant’s actions constituted a
permissible repair or an impermissible infringing reconstruction.13
The courts have used many different labels to capture the same

12

365 U.S. 336 (1961). The Supreme Court issued two decisions involving the same
parties. Even though the first decision is often referred to as Aro I, this Article refers to it
as Aro. The second decision, Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
Co. (Aro II), 377 U.S. 476 (1964), is notable because it found that to be liable for
contributory infringement, there must be a showing that an alleged infringer not only
knew of the patent, but also that the use of the component would infringe the patent. It
said nothing about the heart of the invention.
13
See infra Part III.A. Under the doctrine of repair and reconstruction, a patentee
cannot prevent a purchaser of a patented article from repairing that article. See Aro, 365
U.S. at 342. That is part of the bundle of rights that comes with purchasing the patented
article. However, when the repair becomes so substantial that it is considered a
reconstruction, there is a patent infringement. See id. at 346.
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concept. For example, the terms “essential features/elements,”14
the “gist”15 of the invention, “the point of novelty,”16 and “central
concept”17 have all been used to identify a part of a patent’s claims
that is crucial to understanding the invention and distinguishing it
from the prior art. For simplicity’s sake, this Article uses the
“heart of the invention” to refer to any subset of claim elements or
limitations that are more important than the remaining elements or
limitations for the particular decision under consideration.
This Article does not wish to overstate the significance of the
heart of the invention. For many patents, there is no separable
“heart of the invention.”18 Consider a Post-it note. If the patent
for a Post-it note had only two limitations—a piece of paper and a
re-adherable strip of adhesive—we could not identify just one of
those two as the heart of the invention.19 Both limitations are
absolutely necessary to understand and practice the claimed
invention. To focus on one component by itself would clearly not
do justice to the invention. The fact that some patents do not
reveal a distinct heart of the invention shows that patent doctrines
cannot be solely based on this consideration. Nonetheless, the

14

Decisions discussing the written description doctrine (in the context of the “omitted
elements” test) have used the “essential elements” terminology. See infra notes 199–211
and accompanying text. The current debate over damages patent reform also uses this
label. See infra notes 212–15 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has just
recently used the phrase “essential features” in the context of patent exhaustion. Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2119 (2008); see infra Part IV.B.
15
Aro, 365 U.S. at 345.
16
Decisions discussing inequitable conduct refer to the point of novelty. See infra
notes 44–46 and accompanying text. Similarly, the term “novel aspect of the invention”
has been used in evaluating enablement. Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc.,
501 F.3d 1274, 1284–85 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
17
A recent highly publicized decision on subject matter patentability used the phrase
“central to the purpose of the claimed process.” In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 962 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
18
See Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 2119, 2137 (2008) (stating that “[t]here need not be a singular, defining feature of
an invention that is key to its patentability”); see also Howard T. Markey, Some Patent
Problems, 80 F.R.D. 203, 209 (1979) (“[T]here ain’t no new elements! Only God makes
things out of new elements.”).
19
Holbrook, supra note 18, at 2160 (noting that “the creation of Post-It Notes®
involved the use of two known elements”).
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“heart of the invention” should play an important role in
formulating and applying many doctrines.20
Whether the heart of the invention exists is not just a function
of the underlying technology. Often the way attorneys draft the
patent’s claims determines whether there is a heart of the
invention. If the same Post-it note patent has a third limitation—
for example, restricting the paper to be square—we might identify
the heart of the invention as the first two limitations. The physical
dimensions of the paper are of lesser importance and are not part of
the “heart of the invention.” This example shows how attorneys
can graft additional limitations to an invention and thereby elevate
the importance of the original claim limitations to the point where
they become the heart of the invention.
A. Treatment of the Heart
Having defined the heart of the invention, the next step in the
analysis is to understand how that concept is treated in patent law.
The established view is that the issue has been settled for some
time and the courts are not permitted to consider the heart of the
invention in their analysis.21 The following statement illustrates
the prevailing viewpoint:
the idea of dissecting a component from a patented
combination and analyzing it violates principles that
today at least, are well-settled in patent law. Patent
law inquiries as to the inventiveness of a claim must
consider the combination as a whole, rather than
isolate an individual element, whether or not the
element is identifiable as the gist or heart of the
invention.22
20
See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1799 n.204 (2009) (acknowledging that for
many inventions there may be no “point of novelty,” but arguing that “doesn’t mean it
can’t be helpful [for claim construction] in particular cases”).
21
Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the Apocryphal Axe: Repair, Reconstruction, and the
Implied License in Intellectual Property Law, 58 MD. L. REV. 423, 454 (1999).
22
Id.; see Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1798 (“‘Point of novelty’ as a concept has
a bad reputation in patent law . . . .” (citing W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc.,
721 F.2d 1540, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983))); Holbrook, supra note 18, at 2160 (“The entire
concept of a particular ‘patentably distinctive’ aspect of an invention harkens back to the

C03_CHAO_10-24-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1192

10/24/2010 1:01 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:1183

However, a closer look at the case law shows that patent law
often treats the concept of the heart of the invention differently
depending on what label is used. Decisions rejecting the concept
rely on Aro and use the term “heart of the invention.”23 Decisions
in the area of direct infringement, anticipation, obviousness, the
written description requirement, and the doctrine of repair and
reconstruction fall within this category.24
Thus, to find infringement, it is not sufficient to show that the
accused device possesses the heart of the patented invention.25 A
patentee must prove that each limitation of the claimed invention is
present.26 The same principle applies to the related doctrines of
anticipation27 and obviousness.28 Under these doctrines, an
invention is not patentable if it is either anticipated or rendered
obvious by the prior art.29 To show that the patent is invalid as

rejected concept of the ‘heart’ or ‘gist’ of the invention.” (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v.
Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 345 (1961))); F. Scott Kieff, Quanta v.
LG Electronics: Frustrating Patent Deals by Taking Contracting Options Off the Table?,
2008 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 315, 321. In contrast, the Federal Circuit has only recently
rejected the concept of considering the “point of novelty” when determining infringement
for design patents. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., 543 F.3d 665, 672 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
23
See, e.g., Holbrook, supra note 18, at 2160 (quoting Aro, 365 U.S. at 345).
24
See infra Part III.A.
25
See Janis, supra note 21, at 454.
26
In Allen Engineering v. Bartel, 299 F.3d 1336, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2002), the district
court relied on the fact that the defendant’s product included the heart of the patented
invention to find both literal infringement and infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents. Id. at 1345 (citing Aro for the proposition that “[i]t is well settled that ‘there
is no legally recognizable or protected ‘essential’ element, gist or ‘heart’ of the invention
in a combination patent’”). The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s findings, and
instructed the district court to construe each disputed limitation and compare each of
those limitations to the accused device to determine infringement. See id. at 1354–55.
27
PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., 491 F.3d 1342, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (“‘Anticipation’ means lack of novelty; that is, that the invention was already
known.”). 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2006) defines “novelty” and says that a person is not entitled
to a patent if the invention was known in one of several different categories of prior art.
28
Another condition of patentability is non-obviousness. 35 U.S.C. § 103 states that
even if an invention satisfies § 102’s novelty requirement, the invention is not patentable
if it is obvious in view of the prior art.
29
“Anticipation requires the presence in a single prior art disclosure of all elements of
a claimed invention arranged as in the claim.” Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722
F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983). In contrast, obviousness is a much more flexible test
that may take into account multiple references and secondary factors. See KSR Int’l Co.
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anticipated, it is not sufficient to show that the prior art discloses
the heart of the invention;30 each and every limitation must be
found in the reference.31 Similarly, the doctrine of obviousness
requires an examination of “the subject matter as a whole.”32
The courts also do not consider the heart of the invention when
determining if a claim satisfies the written description
requirement.33 Under this requirement, an inventor must show
possession of the invention at the time the application was filed.34
Again, the written description requirement cannot be satisfied by
merely proving that the heart of the invention was described in the
original specification; rather, the inventor must prove that there
was a written description supporting every limitation found in the
v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007); see also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
1, 17–18 (1966).
30
Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1101 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The
law looks to the particular inquiries set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)–(g), which focus on
knowledge, use, sale, disclosure, etc., of the invention. Notions of ‘concept’, ‘essence’,
‘key’, ‘gist’, etc., are no more useful in the context of § 102 than elsewhere, because they
divert the fact-finder’s attention from the subject matter of the invention as a whole.”).
31
Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffman-LA Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(“Anticipation under § 102(a) generally requires the presence in the prior art of each and
every limitation of the claimed invention.”).
32
35 U.S.C. § 103(a); see also W.L. Gore & Assocs., Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d
1540, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (stating that it was error to focus on a single step of a multistep process to establish invalidity and that “[i]n determining obviousness, there is ‘no
legally recognizable or protected ‘essential’ [element], ‘gist’, or ‘heart’ of the
invention.’” (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336,
345 (1961))); Para-Ordnance Mfg. v. SGS Importers Int’l, Inc., 73 F.3d 1085, 1087 (Fed.
Cir. 1995) (“[W]hen determining obviousness, the claimed invention should be
considered as a whole; there is no legally recognizable ‘heart’ of the invention.” (citing
W.L. Gore, 721 F.3d at 1548)).
33
The written description requirement is found in 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1:
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention,
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full,
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the
art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to
make and use the same . . . .
34
In practice, the written description requirement prevents an inventor from amending
an application’s claims during the prosecution to encompass subject matter that was not
described in the original application. See Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555,
1561 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“‘Adequate description of the invention guards against the
inventor’s overreaching by insisting that he recount his invention in such detail that his
future claims can be determined to be encompassed within his original creation.’”
(quoting Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 551 (3d Cir. 1981))).
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claim.35 Of course, decisions applying the doctrine of repair and
reconstruction must follow Aro, and those do not consider the heart
of the invention.36
On the other hand, there are a number of other doctrines that
focus on a subset of unpatented limitations without labeling it the
heart or gist of the invention, and without discussing Aro. The
most prominent of these doctrines is contributory infringement,
which is codified in 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).37
Contributory
infringement assumes that a party did not make, use, or sell the
entire patented invention.38 Nonetheless, the statute imposes
liability for a party that contributes to another’s act of direct
infringement.39

35

In Vas-Cath, the Federal Circuit found that the district court incorrectly attempted to
identify the “‘novel or important’” part of the invention to determine whether a
specification provided a written description for claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112. Id. at 1565
(quoting Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 745 F. Supp. 517, 522 (N.D. Ill. 1990)). Again, the
Federal Circuit relied on Aro for the proposition that “[t]here is ‘no legally recognizable
or protected ‘essential’ element, ‘gist’ or ‘heart’ of the invention in a combination
patent.’” Id. (quoting Aro, 365 U.S. at 345). The court then compared the written
description to the claim limitations to determine whether there was a factual issue with
respect to priority date. See id. at 1565–67.
36
See, e.g., Porter v. Farmers Supply Serv., Inc., 790 F.2d 882, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(explaining that the Supreme Court “‘has eschewed the suggestion’” of considering
“‘whether the element of the combination that has been replaced is an ‘essential’ or
‘distinguishing’ part of the invention’” (quoting Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas
Co., 448 U.S. 176, 217 (1980))).
37
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) states in full:
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports
into the United States a component of a patented machine,
manufacture, combination, or composition, or a material or apparatus
for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of
the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially
adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial
noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
38
See Giles S. Rich, Infringement Under Section 271 of the Patent Act of 1952, 21
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 521, 531 (1953) (“Contributory infringement within its proper
bounds has always, by its very nature, given protection to something not strictly within
the claim, and in this sense alone ‘unpatented.’” (emphasis omitted)).
39
For contributory infringement to exist, there must be direct infringement by another
party. See BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (“Indirect infringement requires, as a predicate, a finding that some party amongst
the accused actors has committed the entire act of direct infringement.”).
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To determine if a party is liable for contributory infringement,
the statute asks a series of questions. Is the component a “material
part of the [patented] invention”?40 Is it “especially made or
especially adapted for use in an infringement of [the] patent”?41 Is
the component a “staple article or commodity of commerce
suitable for substantial non-infringing use[s]”?42 If the party
supplies a “material part” of the patented invention (i.e., the heart
of the invention) and satisfies the other requirements of § 271(c),
the party can be held liable for contributing to another’s
infringement.43
The doctrine of inequitable conduct also considers the heart of
the invention. Inequitable conduct occurs when a patentee fails to
disclose material information to the patent office with deceptive
intent.44 The issue of materiality is often hotly contested.45 When
undisclosed prior art corresponds to the “point of novelty,” that
showing strongly weighs in favor of finding materiality.46 Again,
the phrase “point of novelty” captures the idea of the “heart of the
invention” without using that label.
The determination of joint inventorship is yet another area in
which patent law considers the heart of the invention. As a general
rule, 35 U.S.C. § 116 requires all the inventors of the claimed
40

17 U.S.C. § 271(c); see also DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.03(4)
(2005).
41
17 U.S.C. § 271(c); see also CHISUM, supra note 40, § 17.03(4).
42
17 U.S.C. § 271(c); see also CHISUM, supra note 40, § 17.03(3).
43
17 U.S.C. § 271(c); see also CHISUM, supra note 40, § 17.03(4).
44
See Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 537 F.3d 1357, 1365–71
(Fed. Cir. 2008), for a discussion and analysis of inequitable conduct.
45
See, e.g., Tech. Licensing Corp. v. Videotek, Inc., 545 F.3d 1316, 1337 (Fed. Cir.
2008); Honeywell Int’l Inc. v. Universal Avionics Sys. Corp., 488 F.3d 982, 1000 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
46
McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 918–19 (Fed.
Cir. 2007) (affirming inequitable conduct finding when undisclosed prior art disclosed
two of the “points of novelty”); Pharmacia Corp. v. Par Pharm., Inc., 417 F.3d 1369,
1373 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (upholding district court’s finding that misleading declarations that
went to the “very point of novelty” were material); Bruno Indep. Living Aids, Inc. v.
Acorn Mobility Servs., Ltd., 394 F.3d 1348, 1353–54 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (finding
materiality where the undisclosed prior art disclosed what the applicant touted as the
“point of novelty”); Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d
1253, 1256–59 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (holding that there was inequitable conduct regarding
undisclosed prior art that disclosed the “point of novelty”).
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invention to jointly apply for a patent.47 If all the proper inventors
are not named, a defendant can argue that a patent is invalid.48
“[T]o be a joint inventor, an individual must make a contribution to
the conception of the claimed invention that is not insignificant in
quality, when that contribution is measured against the dimension
of the full invention.”49 This requires that a person “do more than
merely explain to the real inventors well known concepts and/or
current state of the art.”50 In application, this means that a person
is only an inventor if the person contributed to a “significant” part
of the invention that corresponded to the heart of the invention. If
the person simply provided elements from the prior art that did not
require any special insight, the person is not an inventor.51
Thus, a review of different patent law doctrines shows a
fundamental inconsistency in the way patent law treats the heart of
the invention. On the one hand, many doctrines rely on Aro for a
fundamental rule: patent law does not recognize the heart of the
invention.52
Indeed, this rule has been treated with such
unquestioned reverence that this Article calls the rule Aro’s
commandment. Yet, as shown above, many doctrines in patent
law consistently break this commandment by using different
labels. This conflict clearly needs to be resolved. If Aro’s
commandment is correct, the rule should be followed in all areas of
patent law. If it is not, there needs to be an analytical framework
for understanding when it is appropriate to consider the heart of the
invention. This Article argues that Aro’s commandment is wrong;
there should be no rule against considering the heart of the
47

See CHISUM, supra note 40, § 11.02(2).
See, e.g., BJ Servs. Co. v. Halliburton Energy Servs., Inc., 338 F.3d 1368, 1373–74
(Fed. Cir. 2003). Defendants have relied on 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (2006) to argue that the
failure to name the proper inventors renders a patent invalid. See Pannu v. Iolab Corp.,
155 F.3d 1344, 1349–50 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“[S]ection 102(f) still makes the naming of the
correct inventor or inventors a condition of patentability; failure to name them renders a
patent invalid.”). It should be noted that 35 U.S.C. § 256 allows inventorship to be
corrected if there was no deceptive intent.
49
Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d 1466, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(f); Ethicon, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 135 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
50
Pannu, 155 F.3d at 1351.
51
See Hess v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 106 F.3d 976, 978–79, 980–81
(Fed. Cir. 1997); see infra notes 178–83 and accompanying text.
52
See supra Part I.
48
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invention. It then proceeds to outline a framework for determining
when to consider the heart of the invention.
B. A Rule Outlawing Heart
Even without a detailed examination of Aro’s impact on patent
law, there is something intuitively strange about the rule. This is
not a situation where a rule incidentally causes the judges to
overlook a basic principle in favor of bright line rule. Rather, Aro
expressly instructs courts and juries to continually ignore the
fundamental nature of what a patentee invented.53 However, when
courts pretend that there is no heart of the invention, some results
will inevitably be incorrect, and in many cases, absurd.
This issue is representative of a larger class of problems.
Courts often focus on formalistic rules that ignore the central goals
of the patent system. Rules certainly have their benefits. They
provide objective guidelines for judges and juries to follow.54
However, those rules should not be followed blindly at the expense
of overlooking basic principles.
Jeanne Fromer, Dan Burk and Mark Lemley address a very
similar problem in two recent articles.55 Patent law defines “what
the patentee owns not by what . . . [the patent describes in the
specification], but by what [it] claims.”56 Thus, patent claims have
been compared to “the ‘metes and bounds’ of a real property deed,
defining the outer boundaries of a ‘property’ right conferred on the
patentee.”57 Fromer, Burk and Lemley argue that this system of
peripheral claiming frequently overlooks the fundamental nature of
the invention.58

53

See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 345 (1961).
See John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 774
(2003) (“Advocates of formally realized rules argue that they reduce judicial discretion,
lead to more certain outcomes and provide private actors with the certainty necessary to
order their affairs in an efficient fashion.”).
55
See Burk & Lemley, supra note 20; Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual
Property, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 719 (2009).
56
Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1744.
57
Id. (footnotes omitted). This is called peripheral claiming. Fromer, supra note 55, at
726.
58
See Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1745–46; Fromer, supra note 55, at 757–58.
54
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As a remedy, they propose incorporating central claiming
features into the current system.59 Under a central claiming
approach, the patentee describes the central or prototypical
embodiments with the understanding that the patent will cover a
broader set of similar embodiments.60 According to Burk and
Lemley, central claiming “puts the focus on what the patentee
actually invented rather than on what patent lawyers later (often
much later) drafted as claims to cover the ground in that
invention.”61 Similarly, Fromer argues that central claiming or
claiming by exemplar would serve to provide the public with better
notice about what the patent covers and make it easier for the
United States Patent and Trademark Office to determine whether
an application is patentable.62 Burk and Lemley recognize that a
complete shift to central claiming may not be realistic.63 Instead,
they suggest an intermediate proposal of limiting claim
construction “to terms that are (1) technical and (2) the point of
novelty.”64
Fromer, Burk and Lemley made their recommendations
because the current system of peripheral claiming often leads
judges and juries unintentionally to ignore the actual invention and
instead focus on claims drafted by attorneys.65 Since claims are

59

See Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1746–47; Fromer, supra note 55, at 772.
See Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1746 (“Under a central-claiming approach,
the patentee does not delineate the outer reach of what it claims. Rather, the patentee
discloses the central features of the invention—what distinguishes it from the prior art—
and the courts determine how much protection the patent is entitled to by looking at the
prior art that cabins the invention, how important the patentee’s invention was, and how
different the accused device is.” (footnotes omitted)); Fromer, supra note 55, at 727
(stating that in central claiming, “the rightsholder describes the central, or prototypical,
set members, but the right tends to cover a broader, similar set of items”).
61
Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1787.
62
See Fromer, supra note 55, at 775–77.
63
See Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1795.
64
Id. at 1798. Burk and Lemley state that current claim construction disputes often
have nothing to do with the heart of the invention. See id. Instead, they state that these
disputes focus on drafting errors to limit the patent “in ways the inventor did not intend or
on a deliberate ambiguity to broaden the patent to cover things the patentee did not
invent.” Id. (footnote omitted).
65
Fromer, supra note 55, at 776 (describing how central claiming provides a
“narrower and more concrete [description] covering the heart of the invention rather than
every esoteric variation”).
60
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only imperfect written proxies for the invention, they should not be
treated as if they absolutely define it.66
This Article does not examine central claiming, but tries to
achieve some of the same goals advanced by its proponents.
Courts and juries should not be told that they must always give
equal weight to each limitation of a claim. Like peripheral
claiming, this rule diverts attention to the outer bounds of the
invention, not the heart. Under the right circumstances, courts
should reject Aro’s commandment and focus attention on what the
patentees actually invented. That is fundamentally what Fromer,
Burk and Lemley are trying to do, albeit in a different context.
Indeed, it is very odd that patent law has even arrived at this point.
It seems self evident that some doctrines in patent law need to
examine the heart of the invention. To understand why patent law
has arrived at this anomalous point, this Article goes back half a
century to Aro.
II. THE FOUNDATION, ARO
A. Rejecting the Heart
Although there is certainly relevant older precedent,67 modern
cases cite to Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co. for the proposition that there is no “heart of the
invention” in combination patents and thus courts should not rely
on such a construct in making decisions.68 In Aro, the Supreme
Court rejected the idea that replacing an “essential” or
“distinguishing” part of a patented combination constitutes an
impermissible infringing reconstruction.69 Under the doctrine of
repair and reconstruction, a patentee cannot prevent a purchaser of
66

Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1794 (“The problem is . . . the pretense that the
language on which the interpretation is based can or does concretely define the outer
boundary of the patent holder’s rights. This is essentially an impossibility because
patents describe not a physical entity, but a set of legal entitlements.”).
67
In Aro, the Justices analyzed the historical roots of the doctrine of repair and
reconstruction in arriving at their different opinions. See, e.g., Janis, supra note 21, at
431–43 (discussing the pre-Aro case law on repair and reconstruction).
68
See supra Part I.A.
69
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 344 (1961).
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a patented article from repairing that article.70 That is part of the
bundle of rights that comes with purchasing the patented article.
However, when the repair becomes so substantial that it is
considered a reconstruction, there is a patent infringement.71 In
Aro, the issue was how to distinguish between a permissible repair
and an impermissible reconstruction.72
The plaintiff, Convertible Top Replacement Co., had the rights
to a patent for automobile convertible tops.73 The patent covered
the combination of “a flexible top fabric, supporting structures, and
a mechanism for sealing the fabric against the side of an
automobile body in order to keep out the rain.”74 As might be
expected, the fabric has a much shorter life than the other
components.
The defendant, Aro Manufacturing Co.,
manufactured and sold “replacement fabrics designed to fit the
models of convertibles equipped with tops embodying the
combination covered by the patent.”75
The automobile owners were authorized to use their
convertible tops by virtue of a license that the automobile
manufacturer took from the patentee.76 Under the patentee’s
theory, the automobile owners exceeded the scope of their license
when they replaced the fabric in the convertible tops.77
Accordingly, the patentee sued Aro for contributory infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).78 After trial, the jury returned a verdict
in favor of patentee and Aro appealed.79

70

See id. at 342–43.
See id. at 346.
72
See id. at 342.
73
Convertible Folding Top with Automatic Seal at Rear Quarter, U.S. Patent No.
2,569,724 (filed Aug. 12, 1949) (issued Oct. 2, 1951).
74
Aro, 365 U.S. at 337.
75
Id. at 338.
76
In a subsequent decision, the Supreme Court addressed the liability of the defendant
for replacement tops that were used in automobiles that were not licensed to the patent.
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro II), 377 U.S. 476, 478–81
(1964).
77
Aro, 365 U.S. at 337–38; Aro II, 377 U.S. at 483.
78
Aro, 365 U.S. at 337–38.
79
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 270 F.2d 200, 201 (1st Cir.
1959), rev’d, 365 U.S. 336 (1961).
71
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The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the jury’s verdict.80
The decision framed the basic question as whether Aro was
“merely . . . making a permissible replacement of a part which
expectedly became worn out or defective sooner than other parts of
the patented combination”81 or whether such replacement
constituted a “forbidden reconstruction of the combination.”82 The
court noted that, “[e]ach case must be decided on its own facts,
pretty much as an individual instance.”83
The court then found that Aro was impermissibly
reconstructing the patented combination by examining two
factors.84 First, the court looked at the nature of the component
being replaced and concluded that “the fabric portion of the top
[was] not a minor or relatively inexpensive component of the
patented combination.”85 Second, the court examined the expected
life of the same component and concluded that “the life of the
fabric is not so short, nor is the fabric so cheap, that we can safely
assume that an owner would rationally believe that in replacing it
he was making only a minor repair to his top structure.”86 Relying
on these factors, the court concluded “that the defendants were not
making permissible repairs to, but were substantially
reconstructing, the convertible top combination.”87 This decision
was in turn appealed to the Supreme Court.88
In an opinion authored by Justice Whittaker, the Supreme
Court reversed the First Circuit Court of Appeals and found that
Aro’s actions constituted a permissible repair.89 More importantly,
the Court specifically rejected analysis that relied on the
“essential” or “distinguishing” part of the patented combination by
stating:

80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89

Id. at 206.
Id. at 202.
Id. at 205.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 338 (1961).
Id. at 346.

C03_CHAO_10-24-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1202

10/24/2010 1:01 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:1183

The basic fallacy . . . is that it requires the ascribing
to one element of the patented combination the
status of patented invention in itself. Yet this Court
has made it clear in the two Mercoid cases that
there is no legally recognizable or protected
“essential” element, “gist” or “heart” of the
invention in a combination patent.90
It is this oft quoted passage (in italics) that has become a
foundation of modern patent law. Numerous decisions cite to this
passage when rejecting attempts to focus on only part of a claim.91
It is as if Aro carved a commandment in stone: thou shall not look
at the heart of the invention in patent law.
The Supreme Court went on to discuss what factors could be
properly considered by defining the difference between repair and
reconstruction. With respect to repair, the Court proclaimed: “We
hold that maintenance of the ‘use of the whole’ of the patented
combination through replacement of a spent, unpatented element
does not constitute reconstruction.”92
With respect to reconstruction, the Court stated,
“reconstruction of a patented entity, comprised of unpatented
elements, is limited to such a true reconstruction of the entity as to
‘in fact make a new article.’”93
Aro was far from unanimous. Justice Brennan agreed with the
result (that there was a repair), but disagreed with the majority’s
test.94 He argued that the test described “too narrow a standard of
what constitutes impermissible ‘reconstruction’” and that “there
are circumstances in which the replacement of a single unpatented
component of a patented combination short of a second creation of
the patented entity may constitute ‘reconstruction.’”95 He went on
90

Id. at 344–45 (emphasis added); see also id. at 344 (“For if anything is settled in the
patent law, it is that the combination patent covers only the totality of the elements in the
claim and that no element, separately viewed, is within the grant.”).
91
See supra notes 21–36 and accompanying text.
92
Aro, 365 U.S. at 346.
93
Id. (quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 425 (2d Cir.
1945)).
94
Id. at 362 (Brennan, J., concurring in result).
95
Id.
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to argue that under precedent, “there is no single test to which all
must yield; rather the determination is to be based upon the
consideration of a number of factors.”96 Justice Brennan then
described those factors:
Appropriately to be considered are the life of the
part replaced in relation to the useful life of the
whole combination, the importance of the replaced
element to the inventive concept, the cost of the
component relative to the cost of the combination,
the common sense understanding and intention of
the patent owner and the buyer of the combination
as to its perishable components, whether the
purchased component replaces a worn-out part or is
brought for some other purpose, and other pertinent
factors.97
The second factor, “the importance of the replaced element to
the inventive concept,” is simply another way of determining its
connection to the heart of the invention.98
The dissent, authored by Justice Harlan and joined by Justices
Frankfurter and Stewart, agreed with Justice Brennan’s multifactor approach, but disagreed with his ultimate conclusion.99

96

Id. at 363.
Id. at 363–64 (footnotes omitted). For the purposes of this Article, only one
footnote in Justice Brennan’s concurrence is important. Footnote 3 of Justice Brennan’s
concurrence listed the historical precedent that showed that the heart of the invention was
considered when determining whether a repair or reconstruction had taken place. See id.
at 364 n.3 (citing Leeds & Catlin Co. v. Victor Talking Mach. Co., 213 U.S. 325 (1909);
Morrin v. Robert White Eng’g Works, 143 F. 519 (2d Cir. 1905); Davis Elec. Works v.
Edison Elec. Light Co., 60 F. 276, 279–80 (1st Cir. 1894) (“[I]n certain stages of use the
essence of a device, though in appearance only a small portion of it, may be lost, and its
renewal amount to reconstruction.”)).
98
See id. at 360 (Black, J., concurring) (“A fundamental error underlying the
misleading standards suggested by my Brothers HARLAN and BRENNAN is the notion
that in a case of this kind a court is obliged to search for the alleged ‘heart’ or ‘core’ of
the combination patent.”).
99
Like Justice Brennan, Justice Harlan argued that “there is no single yardstick for
determining whether particular substitutions of new for original unpatented parts of a
patented combination amount to permissible repair or forbidden reconstruction.” Id. at
371 (Harlan, J., dissenting). Harlan’s dissent went on to criticize the Court’s
reconstruction test. Id. at 376 (“[N]one of the past cases in this Court or in the lower
97
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Justice Harlan argued that the lower courts applied the correct
standards and the Supreme Court should defer to the lower courts’
findings.100 Thus, four Justices thought that the heart of the
invention should be considered as one factor in a multi-factor
standard.
Justice Black agreed with the majority decision, yet he wrote a
separate concurrence particularly critical of Justices Brennan’s and
Harlan’s opinions.101 The concurrence characterized the multifactor approach as a “Pandora’s flock of insignificant
standards,”102 and went on to suggest that the test had “ambiguous
evidentiary standards” and would lead to “mischievous results.”103
Justice Black was particularly critical of examining the “alleged
‘heart’ or ‘core’ of a combination patent.”104 He reasoned that “[a]
patented combination is no more than that, a novel relationship
brought to bear on what presumably are familiar elements already
in the public domain. Such familiar elements are not removed
from the public domain merely because of their use, however
crucial, in the novel combination.”105
In the end, six justices found that the defendant had
permissibly repaired the convertible top. However, only five
justices agreed on the standard announced by the majority—a
standard that rejected the heart of the invention analysis. Four
justices, including Justice Brennan, disagreed with the majority’s
test and favored a multi-factored approach that looked at, inter alia,
the importance of the replaced element to the inventive concept.

federal courts remotely suggest that ‘reconstruction’ can be found only in a situation
where the patented combination has been rebuilt de novo from the ground up.”).
100
Id. at 379 (“For reasons larger than this particular litigation I cannot agree that it is
either necessary or appropriate for us to substitute our particular judgment on this
particular application of correct standards to the facts.”).
101
Id. at 346 (Black, J., concurring).
102
Id. at 355.
103
Id. at 357; see also Janis, supra note 21, at 444 (relying on Wilson v. Simpson, 50
U.S. 109 (1850), to argue that the “[Aro] Court’s opinion repudiated the multifactor
approach to repair-reconstruction, asserting inaccurately that such an approach had
appeared only in lower court opinions” (emphasis added)).
104
Aro, 365 U.S. at 361 (Black, J., concurring).
105
Id.
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To this day, the 5–4 Aro decision serves as the basis for the
proposition that there is no “heart of the invention” in combination
patents. Now that the Quanta decision has recently focused on the
essential elements of an invention in the context of patent
exhaustion,106 this Article argues that it is time to revisit Aro. In
Part II.B and C infra, this Article explains why Aro’s analysis
suffers from a number of deficiencies. First and foremost, the
standard leads to results that are difficult to apply and inconsistent
with notions of justice. Second, the Aro decision incorrectly relied
on principles from the two Mercoid decisions. In enacting §
271(c), Congress explicitly rejected the results of these two
decisions and, implicitly, their principles.
B. Problems with Aro’s Standard
The Aro standard suffers from two analytical problems. First,
the test is simply unhelpful. Second, the test leads to results that
are inconsistent with commonsense notions of what repair and
reconstruction are. These problems can be seen by examining the
two end points found in Aro. At one end, a reconstruction “is
limited to such a true reconstruction of the entity as to ‘in fact
make a new article.’”107 The test is tautological and simply recharacterizes the term using words that sound just like the original
term. Federal Circuit Judge Gajarsa characterized the test as “we
know a reconstruction when we see it.”108 It sheds no new light on
what a reconstruction is.109

106

Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2113 (2008).
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961)
(quoting United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 1945)).
108
Arthur J. Gajarsa, Evelyn Mary Aswad & Joseph S. Cianfrani, How Much Fuel to
Add to the Fire of Genius? Some Questions About the Repair/Reconstruction Distinction
in Patent Law, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1205, 1222 (1999); see also FMC Corp. v. Up-Right
Inc., 21 F.3d 1073, 1078 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (declining to state a bright line test where the
plaintiff complained that the entire standard was too “amorphous” and asked the Federal
Circuit to “state the standard more clearly in a way that can be understood and applied
both by patent owners and potential infringers”).
109
See Janis, supra note 21, at 446 (stating that this passage “is nothing but a
restatement of the exhaustion principle unaccompanied by any thoughtful analysis as to
whether exhaustion is an appropriate organizing principle for repair-reconstruction”).
107
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At the other end of the spectrum, Aro says that “replacement of
a spent unpatented element” is a repair.110 That may help classify
some simple cases. However, it does not help resolve the more
difficult cases that reside in the middle. If a claim is made of
components A though H, would someone replacing components A
through G be found to be repairing the item? What if they replaced
all the components over time?
This issue was explored by the Federal Circuit in FMC Corp. v.
Up-Right Inc.111 The plaintiff argued that “when the replacement
parts added over time dominate the original parts, reconstruction
The Federal Circuit carefully avoided
has occurred.”112
commenting on the correctness of plaintiff’s theory. However, the
decision stated that even under this theory, the plaintiff would have
lost because it “had failed to establish that a majority of the parts
of the patented combination had been replaced in any particular
[product].”113 Thus, the Court in FMC did not reject the possibility
that the replacing of parts may be so extensive as to constitute an
impermissible reconstruction.114
However, a subsequent Federal Circuit decision stated that the
theory was not viable. In Husky Injection Molding Systems, Ltd. v.
R & D Tool & Engineering Co.,115 the court said that “[e]ven if the
owner sequentially replaces all of the worn-out parts of a patented
combination, this sequential replacement does not constitute
reconstruction.”116 This conclusion was dicta, but it shows how
narrowly one Federal Circuit panel interpreted the reconstruction
standard. Indeed, this is the kind of narrow interpretation of

110

Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961).
21 F.3d 1073 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
112
Id. at 1078.
113
Id. (“The district court found this to be the case regardless of whether one counted
the number of parts in the grape harvester having corresponding elements in the claimed
combination without assigning to them any relative values, economic or otherwise, or
whether one attempted to assign such values.”).
114
See id. at 1077 (“This case therefore does not present us with the more difficult issue
of how much repair to a grape harvester made altogether at any single point in time
would have risen to the level of reconstruction of a ‘spent’ grape harvester.”).
115
291 F.3d 780 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
116
Id. at 786 (citing Surfco Haw. v. Fin Control Sys. Pty, Ltd., 264 F.3d 1062, 1065
(Fed. Cir. 2001); FMC, 21 F.3d at 1077).
111
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reconstruction that concerned Justices Brennan and Harlan.117 Of
course, the next question is how close in time can all the parts be
replaced: a year, a month, a day? More importantly, why should
the span of time over which all the parts are replaced distinguish a
permissible repair from an impermissible reconstruction?
Other portions of Husky go on to suggest some bizarre
inconsistencies. While acknowledging that Aro rejected the heart
of the invention analysis, the Federal Circuit suggested that “there
may be some concept of proportionality inherent in the distinction
between repair and reconstruction.”118 In particular, the court
suggested that if a patent covered an automobile, “few would argue
that the retention of the spark plugs and the replacement of the
remainder of the car at a single stroke was permissible activity akin
to repair.”119 Thus, while Husky says that replacing all of the parts
of a patented combination over time is merely a repair, it also
suggests that if sufficient components are replaced at the same
time, reconstruction has taken place. Adding uncertainty to
confusion, the court gave no guidance on how to determine when
that reconstruction threshold has been reached.
The two results of the Husky analysis are not reconcilable. But
that is not the Federal Circuit’s fault. The conflicting results
simply reflect the inherent tension between Aro’s standard and
commonsense. On the one hand, the Supreme Court has held that
replacement of a spent part of a combination patent, which is not
separately patented, is not an impermissible reconstruction no
matter how essential it may be to the patented combination and no
matter how costly or difficult replacement may be.120 On the other
hand, the Federal Circuit correctly noted that no one would
seriously argue that Husky’s automobile example was a mere
117
See supra text accompanying note 95 (regarding Justice Brennan’s view); see also
Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (characterizing the majority’s concept of what constitutes reconstruction as
“narrow”).
118
Husky, 291 F.3d at 786–87; see also Canon, Inc. v. GCC Int’l Ltd., 263 F. App’x 57,
61 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that the concept of proportionality is pertinent to determining
whether a refurbishment is considered a repair or a reconstruction; the same is true for the
case of replaceable parts, but less so).
119
Husky, 291 F.3d at 786.
120
Aro, 365 U.S. at 346.
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repair.121 But that example uses the heart of the invention test,
albeit without calling it such. Instead of identifying the essential
elements of the invention and suggesting that replacing those
elements constitutes reconstruction, the Federal Circuit used the
automobile example to identify the insignificant part of the
invention and suggest that if only that part is retained, there is a
reconstruction.122 Both Husky and FMC demonstrate how difficult
it is to apply Aro’s standard in a manner that comports with
commonsense notions of what repair and reconstruction are.
Those decisions are not alone. Earlier, Judge Gajarsa asked if
another Federal Circuit decision, Aktiebolag v. E.J. Co.123
“implicitly resurrect[ed] the ‘heart of the invention’ test that was
rejected by Aro [I]?”124 He also noted that yet another decision,
Lummus Industries, Inc. v. D.M. & E. Corp.,125 approved jury
instructions that “seem[ed] to direct the jury to focus on a ‘heart of
the invention’ test . . . . contrary to the mandate in Aro [I].”126
Another example illustrates why considering the heart of the
invention would help draw a more sensible line between repair and
reconstruction. Consider a patent that claims a computer with a
microprocessor, a memory, and a bus.127 Of course, computers
with these elements are well known in the prior art. In this case,
the microprocessor contains additional limitations that distinguish
the claimed invention from the prior art. Specifically, the
microprocessor ensures that the most current data is retrieved from
main memory by monitoring data requests and updating main
memory when stale data is requested. Common sense would
suggest that the additional microprocessor limitations are the
essential features of invention.
Now assume that the technology is accepted by the market
place, and that the patent holder licenses the patent to personal
computer manufacturers. A refurbishing company comes along
121
122
123
124
125
126
127

Husky, 291 F.3d at 786.
Id.
121 F.3d 669 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
See Gajarsa et al., supra note 108, at 1217.
862 F.2d 267 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
See Gajarsa et al., supra note 108, at 1221.
See Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2113 (2008).
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and takes personal computers (that are licensed) and replaces the
old microprocessors with new faster microprocessors that also
update memory in the manner claimed by the patent. Since the
refurbishing company simply replaced a component, an activity
that Aro specifically labeled a repair,128 the company has not
infringed the patent.129 Yet the only contribution the patent added
to the prior art were limitations found in the microprocessor. This
is precisely the kind of activity that should be considered an
infringing reconstruction. If it were otherwise, a resourceful
company could take old IBM personal computer frames from the
scrapheap, place new hardware (motherboards, memory buses,
etc.) into the frames and automatically receive licenses to the same
personal computer patents that IBM has licensed.130
In contrast, assume that the refurbishing company only
replaces the memory with faster memory that can store more
information. In this case, it seems entirely appropriate that the law
calls this activity a repair and that the patent holder receive
nothing. Although memory was a component of the patented
invention, it certainly was not an essential element of the
invention. The critical distinction between these examples is how
essential the replaced component is to the invention. Does the
replaced component go to the heart of the invention or not? Aro
forbids this kind of analysis.131
C. The Shaky Precedent Underlying Aro
Not only does the standard in Aro lead to unjust results, it is
also based on shaky precedent. The Supreme Court explicitly
relied on the two Mercoid decisions to prove that there is no

128

See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 346 (1961).
See id.
130
Take the analysis one step further. Imagine if the same company were to combine
old stock parts from various competing computer manufacturers while filling the key
parts with the latest technology. Would the computers have patents rights from all these
competitors? Surely, this is an absurd result.
131
Gajarsa et al., supra note 108, at 1210 (explaining that the Supreme Court “rejected
the ‘heart of the invention’ test, which analyzes whether the most essential element is
being replaced”).
129
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legally recognizable or protectable heart of the invention.132
However, the Patent Act of 1952 superseded the results of the
Mercoid decisions133 and thus implicitly rejected the reasoning that
Aro used.
In the Mercoid cases, the patent holder argued that the
defendant was liable for contributory infringement because it made
and sold an unpatented component (stoker switches) used in the
patented invention (a home heating system).134 The defendant
argued that the patent holders had committed patent misuse by
attempting to control an unpatented component.135 In analyzing
the issues, the Supreme Court explained that:
The fact that an unpatented part of a combination
patent may distinguish the invention does not draw
to it the privileges of a patent. That may be done
only in the manner provided by law. However
worthy it may be, however essential to the patent,
an unpatented part of a combination patent is no
more entitled to monopolistic protection than any
other unpatented device.136
The Supreme Court held that the patent holder had committed
patent misuse even though the court of appeals found that there
was no other use for the unpatented component.137 As a result, the
patent holder could not pursue a theory of contributory
infringement.138 Although the Mercoid decisions did not formally
reject the doctrine of contributory infringement, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that it was limiting the doctrine “substantially.”139
132
See Aro, 365 U.S. at 344–45; id. at 361 n.13 (Black, J., concurring) (relying on
Mercoid I).
133
See Nard, supra note 6, at 72 n.105.
134
Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continent Inv. (Mercoid I), 320 U.S. 661, 662–63 (1944).
135
See id. at 666–67.
136
Mercoid Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator (Mercoid II), 320 U.S. 680,
684 (1944).
137
Mercoid I, 320 U.S. at 664.
138
Id. at 668.
139
Id. at 669; see also Charles W. Adams, A Brief History of Indirect Liability for
Patent Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 369, 384 (2006)
(“The effect of the Mercoid decisions was to render combination patents, which comprise
nearly all patents, unenforceable whenever it was impractical to bring individual actions
against infringers who were widely dispersed.”); Rich, supra note 38, at 535
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The Mercoid decisions caused considerable consternation in
the patent bar140 and lead to the enactment of 35 U.S.C § 271(c) by
the Patent Act of 1952, setting forth the elements of contributory
infringement.141 A party can be liable for providing an unpatented
component of a combination patent so long as § 271(c)’s
requirements are satisfied.142 The component must constitute a
material part of the invention; the alleged infringer must know that
the component is especially made or adapted for use in an
infringement; and the component cannot be a staple of commerce
with substantial non-infringing uses.143 Subsection (d) protects
parties from charges of patent misuse when they pursue a theory of
contributory infringement.144 Thus, to the extent the Mercoid
cases limited the doctrine of contributory infringement, the Patent
Act of 1952 removed those limits.
By supplanting the Mercoid decisions, the Patent Act of 1952
suggests that Congress disagreed with the Supreme Court’s
decisions and the underlying analysis in those cases—that there is
no heart of an invention. At least part of the legislative history of §
271 provides additional support for that conclusion. The Senate
Report accompanying the Patent Act of 1952 stated, “‘[o]ne who
(“[C]ontributory infringement, as a doctrine, was left untouched by the misuse cases.
But its applicability was rendered progressively more difficult by the things the Supreme
Court said in the line of misuse cases that happened to come before it.”).
140
See Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 199 (1980) (“The
Mercoid decisions left in their wake some consternation among patent lawyers and a
degree of confusion in the lower courts.” (footnote omitted)).
141
See id. at 200 (explaining that the Patent Act of 1952 was instituted as corrective
legislation).
142
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2006).
143
See id. § 271(c).
144
Id. Section (d) states:
No patent owner otherwise entitled to relief for infringement or
contributory infringement of a patent shall be denied relief or deemed
guilty of misuse or illegal extension of the patent right by reason of
his having done one or more of the following: (1) derived revenue
from acts which if performed by another without his consent would
constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (2) licensed or
authorized another to perform acts which if performed without his
consent would constitute contributory infringement of the patent; (3)
sought to enforce his patent rights against infringement or
contributory infringement . . . .
Id. § 271(d).
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makes a special device constituting the heart of a patented
machine and supplies it to others with directions (specific or
implied) to complete the machine is obviously appropriating the
benefit of the patented invention.’”145 That statement directly
contradicts the view advanced in the Mercoid cases.146
Of course the Supreme Court was aware of the Patent Act of
1952 in Aro. The defendant was being accused of contributory
infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).147 Moreover, Justice
Brennan’s concurrence indirectly identified the inconsistency
between the Patent Act of 1952 and Mercoid’s rejection of the
“heart of invention”:
It is true that some decisions of this Court in patent
misuse cases raised doubt as to the continuing
vitality of this [multi-factor] standard in actions
such as this one for relief from contributory
infringement. But the Congress swept away that
doubt when it gave the standard statutory sanction
in 1952.148
Similarly, Justice Harlan argued that the “opinion of the Court
seems to reconfirm Mercoid to fuller effectiveness than it had even
before the 1952 Act by treating it as if the test of whether there was
contributory infringement at all was to be found in its language.”149
However, both Justice Whittaker’s majority opinion150 and Justice
Black’s151 concurrence failed to address this inconsistency. It
145

Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 366 n.9 (1961)
(quoting H.R. REP. NO. 82-1923, at 9 (1952)).
146
Compare supra text accompanying note 136, with supra text accompanying note
145.
147
Aro, 365 U.S. at 340–41.
148
Id. at 365 (Brennan, J., concurring in result) (footnotes omitted).
149
Id. at 378 n.6 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
150
The majority opinion mentions that Mercoid II also stood for the proposition that
there can be no contributory infringement without direct infringement and that the Patent
Act of 1952 did not change that part of the law. Id. Those statements are undoubtedly
correct, but say nothing about the “heart of the invention” analysis.
151
Justice Black’s concurrence does not reflect an understanding that the Patent Act of
1952 has any direct relationship to the Mercoid decisions. In one part of his opinion, he
argues that discussion of contributory infringement and the Patent Act of 1952 are
“confusing and beside the point.” Id. at 347 (Black, J., concurring). In another part, he
cites to Mercoid I to demonstrate that the Supreme Court has “unequivocally” rejected
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could be that the Justices did not fully appreciate the issue. Justice
Brennan’s argument was not straightforward, and Justice Harlan’s
discussion was relegated to a footnote. Moreover, the “heart of the
invention” analysis was not the primary issue in Aro. It was
simply one factor in the multi-factor approach that Justices
Brennan and Harlan were advocating.152 Alternatively, Aro could
simply illustrate the Supreme Court’s continued hostility toward
the doctrine of contributory infringement.153 Regardless of the
reason, the fact remains that the majority’s reliance on the Mercoid
precedent is questionable. Nonetheless, modern cases continue to
cite to the discussion of the “heart of the invention” in Aro as one
of the basic tenets of patent law.154
Instead of relying on the Mercoid decisions and stating that
there is no legally recognizable or protected “essential” element,
“gist” or “heart” of the invention in a combination patent, Aro
should have relied on § 271(c). If it had, the Supreme Court would
have understood that Congress had rejected the view in Mercoid
and recognized that a subset of claim limitations may be
sufficiently important to result in liability under the theory of
contributory infringement. The same should be true for the
doctrine of repair and reconstruction. If a party replaces
component(s) that can properly be considered the heart of a
patented invention, that fact should weigh in favor of finding an
impermissible reconstruction. As Justice Brennan’s multi-factor
approach suggests, there may be other factors. However, the heart
of the invention analysis should certainly be an important one.
In sum, Aro’s refusal to recognize the “heart of the invention”
was approved by a narrow 5–4 majority. That refusal has made the
test for repair and reconstruction difficult to apply and inconsistent

the notion that the Court should search for the “heart” or “core” of a combination patent.
Id. at 360–61.
152
See supra notes 97–100 and accompanying text.
153
The Supreme Court, 1960 Term, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40, 244 (1961) (“[S]ection 271
has not abated the Court’s hostility toward the incidental monopolies of unpatented
elements that combination-patent holders frequently seek.”).
154
See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom.
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
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with commonsense notions of what those concepts are.155
Moreover, the decision was based on precedent that had already
been overruled by the time Aro was decided. Nonetheless, modern
decisions continue to rely on Aro for the proposition that there is
no “heart of the invention” in combination patents and that courts
should not rely on such a construct in making decisions. The
weakness in the Supreme Court’s analysis of both the law and the
policy suggests that the lower courts should not be so quick to give
such uncritical reverence to Aro and automatically apply its
commandment to other patent law doctrines. Indeed, these flaws
suggest that Aro was wrongly decided.156
III. RECONCILING A BROKEN HEART
Although the preceding section was highly critical of Aro, this
Article does not recommend a complete reversal of Aro’s
commandment. A rule proclaiming the universal importance of the
heart of the invention would be equally as foolish as the rule
rejecting that consideration. As is often the case, the law should

155
Professor Janis also criticizes how the doctrine of repair and reconstruction has
evolved. However, instead of proposing to more accurately align the test with what our
general notions of what repair and reconstruction are, he argues that the entire framework
should be reconceptualized. Rather than considering what he calls “spentness,” Janis
suggests that the standard of permissible repair should be thought of as an implied license
based on the reasonable expectations of the parties. Janis, supra note 21, at 520–21. It is
beyond the scope of this Article to provide a full critique of this recommendation.
However, one major concern comes to mind quickly. The doctrine of repair and
reconstruction often relates to what third parties can do with a product. Therefore, if the
law follows the expectation of the parties to the transaction, third party rights that society
may wish to exist (e.g., the ability to refurbish an almost new product) may suffer. See
Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property:
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 26–27 (2000) (explaining that standard
rights (i.e., non-negotiable) in property law exist, in part, because of the difficulty in
measuring externality costs (e.g., the costs imposed on strangers)). Thus, Professor
Janis’s recommendation would probably curtail the ability of consumers to perform even
minor repairs because there would be little incentive for a buyer to protect their third
party rights.
156
Commentators of the time both approved of and criticized the Aro decision. The
discussion focused on the proper test for repair and reconstruction and how that impacted
contributory infringement. See Janis, supra note 21, at 443 n.102 (citing to various
articles that appeared soon after Aro).
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apply a more nuanced approach. In some contexts examining the
heart of the invention is imminently sensible. In others, it is not.
By examining the existing case law, this section provides an
analytical framework for determining when specific patent law
doctrines should and should not consider the heart of the invention.
If the doctrine at issue needs to determine whether a product or
process falls within the boundaries protected by a patent, the heart
of the invention should not be considered. Rather, the “all
elements” rule should apply.157 However, there are many doctrines
that do not seek to make that determination. In those cases, the
particular aims of the doctrine may call for considering the heart of
the invention.
This framework is useful for two reasons. First, it can identify
when certain existing doctrines have gone wrong. For example,
the preceding section argued that the heart of the invention was
incorrectly rejected in the context of repair and reconstruction.158
Since the doctrine of repair and reconstruction does not assess
whether something falls within the boundaries of a patent, the
proposed framework supports that conclusion. Second, a sound
framework can help the courts understand when the heart of the
invention should be considered in developing areas of patent law.
Even now, there are several ongoing debates as to whether the
heart of the invention should be considered. These debates include
subject matter patentability, damages, the “omitted elements” test,
and even enablement. This section proceeds to apply the analytical
framework outlined above to those areas and make
recommendations.
A. Existing Doctrines
By examining direct infringement, anticipation, and
obviousness on the one hand and contributory infringement,
inequitable conduct, and joint inventorship on the other hand, this
section explains why it makes sense to reject the heart of the
invention in some situations while considering that factor in other

157

See Meurer & Nard, supra note 7, at 1979–80, for a brief historical discussion of the
all elements rule.
158
See supra Part II.B–C.
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contexts. For the most part, those decisions that reject considering
the “heart of the invention,” do so for basically the same reason.
They are applying or extending the “all elements” rule. That rule
“holds that an accused product or process is not infringing unless it
contains each limitation of the claim, either literally or by an
equivalent.”159
The patent law defines “what the patentee owns not by what
she actually built or disclosed, but by what she claimed.”160 The
“all elements” rule is a natural consequence of using the claims to
define the boundaries of a patented invention. It is entirely
reasonable to insist that all of the limitations of a claim be present
when determining whether a particular product, process, or
embodiment falls within those boundaries or not.
With that understanding in mind, rejecting the heart of the
invention in some contexts is necessary because all of a patent’s
limitations must be considered. For example, in the context of
direct infringement, every element of the claimed invention must
be found in the accused device to show infringement.161 To prove
that a patent is invalid as anticipated, the prior art reference must
disclose each and every limitation.162 Similarly, to show that a
patent is invalid as obvious, all the limitations of a patented
invention must be considered.163 This is actually a statutory
requirement. Section 103 discusses how obviousness must be
judged by looking at both the prior art and the invention “as a
whole.”164 Thus, each of these doctrines sensibly examines all of
159

Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(citing Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29 (1997)); see
also id. (“Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the
scope of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to
individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole.” (quoting WarnerJenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
160
See Burk & Lemley, supra note 20, at 1744. Much of Fromer, Burk and Lemley’s
criticisms of peripheral claiming apply directly to the “all elements” rule.
161
See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
162
See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
163
See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
164
Section § 103(a) states:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically
disclosed or described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the
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the limitations of a claim and refuses to consider the heart of the
invention.
Other doctrines do not need to determine whether a product or
process falls within the boundaries protected by a patent. In these
contexts, it makes sense to focus on a subset of the patent’s claims
that make up the heart of the invention. For example, the doctrine
of contributory infringement sets forth the requirements for
holding a party liable for contributing to another’s infringement
when the party does not directly infringe the patent itself.165 In
other words, contributory infringement only applies to a party that
is not directly infringing a patent. Thus, § 271(c) focuses on the
“material part of an invention.”166 This is the only sensible way to
impose liability for contributory infringement.
Indeed, rejecting the heart of the invention in contributory
infringement would lead to undesirable results. Such a rejection
could take one of two basic forms. First, the law could discard this
consideration entirely and impose no liability for supplying a part
of an invention, no matter how important, thereby making the heart
of the invention analysis unnecessary. Under this hypothetical
rule, a manufacturer supplying a microprocessor to a computer
manufacturer could not be held liable for contributing to the
infringement of the computer patent requiring a microprocessor
with specialized algorithms. In essence, this was the rule from the
Mercoid decisions, which were overruled by § 271(c).167 This rule
is consistent with Aro’s commandment, but it would have allowed
parties an easy way to escape infringement. They could supply all
but one very insignificant part of an invention, allowing their
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having
ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. . . .
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
165
See supra notes 37–43 and accompanying text.
166
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (“Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or
imports into the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented
process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially
made or especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be
liable as a contributory infringer.” (emphasis added)).
167
See supra Part II.C.
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customers to complete the invention.168 Alternatively, the law
could say that contributory infringement exists whenever a party
supplies any part of the patented invention. This rule also does not
require examining the heart of the invention. However, it would
impose liability on those that provide very basic components, or to
use the language of § 271, staples of commerce.169
Instead, § 271(c) only imposes liability on those that supply a
“material part of the invention” knowing that it will be used to
infringe the patent.170 By considering the heart of the invention, §
271 narrowly focuses liability on those parties that actually bear
responsibility for third party infringement. Since this analysis does
not evaluate whether something falls within a patent’s boundaries,
contributory infringement represents an entirely appropriate
treatment of the heart of the invention.
Inequitable conduct is another doctrine that does not ask
whether something—in this case, the prior art—falls within the
boundaries protected by the patent. Rather, in assessing whether a
patentee failed to disclose material prior art during the prosecution
of its application, inequitable conduct sensibly focuses on the
“point of novelty.”171 This is just another pseudonym for the heart
of the invention. The fact that patent law examines the point of
novelty when determining materiality is not controversial. Indeed,
use of a claim chart analysis (i.e., examining all the elements)
would restrict the doctrine to those few cases in which a complete
anticipation was suppressed and lead to absurd results. Consider
one of the patents involved in Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp.172
U.S. Patent No. 5,343,970 (the “’970 patent”) relates to a hybrid

168

Although a patent holder technically can sue the end customers, it is far easier to sue
one supplier than multiple end users. In fact, the Supreme Court recognized this principle
in a copyright infringement case. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929–30 (2005) (recognizing that for practical reasons a plaintiff may
need to sue distributors of the “copying device” instead of the direct infringers who
downloaded pirated music).
169
In other words, would those parties that sell monitors be liable for the infringement
of every computer patent that happened to recite a monitor?
170
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
171
See supra notes 44–46 and accompanying text.
172
504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The issue of inequitable conduct was not at issue in
this case. This decision was merely selected to provide an example of an actual patent.
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electric vehicle.173 In traditional vehicles, an internal combustion
engine transfers power to the wheels.174 One of the technical
issues in a hybrid vehicle is how to control the relative
contributions of both the internal combustion engine and the
electric motor.175
The ’970 patent disclosed a “controllable torque transfer unit”
that accepts torque from both sources.176 However, the claims
include other elements such as a battery that supplies and stores
electric energy.177 Of course, suitable batteries are well known in
the prior art and the Patent Office would not expect the patentee to
disclose all prior art related to rechargeable batteries. However,
the patentee probably was under a duty to disclose any prior art
that described controllable torque transfer units that accepted
energy from two different sources. Again, the critical distinction
between these two examples is whether the undisclosed prior art
goes to the heart of the invention, and in this case, undisclosed
prior art relating to the controllable torque transfer units does go to
the heart of the invention. This example shows why inequitable
conduct does and should consider the heart of the invention.
Finally, the doctrine of joint inventorship does not attempt to
evaluate whether a product or process falls within the boundaries
outlined by a patent, and therefore, it also makes sense for this
doctrine to consider the “heart of the invention.” Hess v. Advanced
Cardiovascular Systems, Inc.178 illustrates this point. In Hess, an
engineer brought an action against a patentee seeking to be named
as a co-inventor of a patent covering a balloon angioplasty
catheter.179 The named inventors were doctors and “[t]hey
explained to the [plaintiff] what they were trying to do, and what
difficulties they encountered.”180 The plaintiff was an engineer
unfamiliar with angioplasty catheterization.181 He “recommended
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181

See id. at 1296.
See id.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 1298.
106 F.3d 976 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Id. at 977.
Id. at 980.
Id.
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a . . . product that he believed would be suitable for making a
balloon, showed [the inventors] how a balloon could be formed by
heating both ends of the tube . . . , and made other suggestions for
making the catheter, using [specific] tubing.”182 Despite the
engineer’s contributions, the Federal Circuit said that the lower
court had “justifiably concluded . . . that it was [the doctors], and
not [the plaintiff], who actually conceived and made the patented
invention and that [the plaintiff’s] contributions to the inventions
did not constitute the conception necessary to establish coinventorship.”183 The engineer was not an inventor because his
contributions were not related to the heart of the invention.
In sum, an examination of different patent law doctrines
reveals that there are sound reasons to both consider and reject an
inquiry as to the “heart of the invention.” If the doctrine at issue
needs to determine whether a product or process falls within the
boundaries protected by a patent, the “heart of the invention”
should not be considered. Rather, the “all elements” rule should
apply. However, there are many doctrines that do not entail that
inquiry. In those cases, the particular aims of the doctrine may call
for considering the “heart of the invention.”
B. Developing Doctrines
The analytical framework discussed above can provide some
insights into several of the ongoing debates in patent law. Subject
matter patentability, damages determinations, the written
description requirement, and enablement have all recently
discussed whether the “central concept,” “essential elements,” or
“novel aspect” of the invention should play an important role in
their respective doctrines.
In 2008, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue of patentable
subject matter in In re Bilski.184 The applicants sought a patent on
a method of hedging risk in trading commodities and commodity
options.185 The claims were not specifically tied to any computer
182

Id.
Id. at 980–81.
184
545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct.
3218 (2010).
185
Id. at 949.
183
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or other device and did not result in a tangible product.186 The
Federal Circuit found that the claims of the application did not
cover patentable subject matter.187 In arriving at this decision, the
opinion set out a new test requiring a claimed “process” under 35
U.S.C. § 101 to be either: (1) tied to a particular machine or
apparatus, or (2) transform a particular article into a different state
or thing.188 More recently, the Supreme Court found that while the
so called “machine-or-transformation” test is “a useful and
important clue, an investigative tool, for determining whether some
claimed inventions are processes under § 101 . . . [it] is not the sole
test for deciding whether an invention is a patent-eligible
‘process.’”189
Regardless of the primacy of the machine-or-transformation
test, it is a test that considers the heart of the invention. In the
Federal Circuit decision, Judge Michel’s plurality opinion did not
refer to the heart of the invention, but used other language that
describes the same concept. First, the Bilski decision stated that
“even if a claim recites a specific machine or particular
transformation of a specific article, the recited machine or
transformation must not constitute mere ‘insignificant postsolution
activity.’”190 Thus, adding a data-gathering step to an algorithm

186

See id. Claim 1 said:
A method for managing the consumption risk costs of a commodity
sold by a commodity provider at a fixed price comprising the steps
of: (a) initiating a series of transactions between said commodity
provider and consumers of said commodity wherein said consumers
purchase said commodity at a fixed rate based upon historical
averages, said fixed rate corresponding to a risk position of said
consumer; (b) identifying market participants for said commodity
having a counter-risk position to said consumers; and (c) initiating a
series of transactions between said commodity provider and said
market participants at a second fixed rate such that said series of
market participant transactions balances the risk position of said
series of consumer transactions.

Id.
187

Id. at 966.
Id. at 961; see also id. at 960 (reaffirming “that the machine-or-transformation test
outlined by the Supreme Court is the proper test to apply”).
189
Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).
190
Bilski, 545 F.3d at 957.
188
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does not make the algorithm patentable.191 Second, the decision
said that the “transformation must be central to the purpose of the
claimed process.”192
The terms “insignificant postsolution
activity” and “central to the purpose” both require identifying the
heart of the invention. Thus, under Bilski, the limitations which
form the heart of the invention must be identified, and then the
machine/transformation test is applied to those specific limitations.
The relationship between the language used by Judge Michel
and Aro did not go unnoticed.
Judge Newman’s dissent
complained that the concepts mentioned above “raise new conflicts
The dissent went on to recite Aro’s
with precedent.”193
commandment and list a number of cases that followed Aro.194
Judge Newman was concerned that it was too difficult to identify
process components for the “centrality” and “significance” of their
“extra-solution activity.”195 Thus, Judge Newman argued that the
test announced by Bilski would not provide a reliable standard. In
reviewing the Federal Circuit’s decision, the Supreme Court had
the opportunity to comment on the impact that Aro might have on
the machine-or-transformation test. It did not do so. This silence
can be interpreted in two ways. The most likely explanation is that
the Court simply overlooked how the machine-or-transformation
may be inconsistent with Aro.196 Alternatively, by characterizing

191
See id. at 963 (citing In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1989); In re Meyer,
688 F.2d 789, 794 (C.C.P.A. 1982)).
192
Id. at 962.
193
Id. at 994 (Newman, J., dissenting).
194
Id. (“This court and the Supreme Court have stated that ‘there is no legally
recognizable or protected ‘essential’ element, ‘gist’ or ‘heart’ of the invention in a
combination patent.’ This rule applies with equal force to process patents, and is in
accord with the rule that the invention must be considered as a whole, rather than
‘dissected,’ in assessing its patent eligibility under Section 101.” (internal citations
omitted) (citing Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981); Allen Eng’g Corp. v.
Bartell Indus., Inc., 299 F.3d 1336, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2002); W.L. Gore & Assocs. v.
Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983))).
195
Id. (“It is difficult to predict an adjudicator’s view of the ‘invention as a whole,’ now
that patent examiners and judges are instructed to weigh the different process components
for their ‘centrality’ and the ‘significance’ of their ‘extra-solution activity’ in a Section
101 inquiry.”).
196
A review of Bilski v. Kappos shows that Aro is never mentioned by any of the
opinions.
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the test as a useful tool,197 the Supreme Court may have implicitly
found that Aro did not invalidate its use. In either case, the
machine-or-transformation is clearly part of patent law despite the
fact that it considers the heart of the invention.
The framework set forth in this Article suggests that the current
state of affairs is acceptable. The issue of patentable subject matter
does not try to assess whether some process falls within a patent’s
boundaries. Rather, it asks whether the subject matter of the claim
is of the type that can be patented. Therefore, Judge Newman’s
reliance on Aro and its progeny is misplaced. There is no reason to
reject the “heart of the invention” and apply the “all elements”
rule. Indeed, focusing on the “heart of the invention” when
determining patentability is quite rational. To blindly assume that
all the limitations are equal would allow clever applicants to add
superfluous limitations to render an otherwise unpatentable idea
patentable. For example, having a computer print data limitation
does not mean that an invention suddenly passes the machine-ortransformation test when the printing step has nothing to do with
the central concept of the invention.
Thus, this Article
recommends that the courts decline to rely on Aro as the law of
patentable subject matter develops.198
There is also currently a question of whether a claim can omit
an essential element of the invention and still satisfy the written
description requirement.199 In Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline
Corp.,200 the Federal Circuit found that amended claims omitting
an element essential to the invention were invalid for failing to
satisfy the written description requirement.201 Commentators have
197

Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227 (2010).
Of course, this should not be interpreted as an endorsement of Bilski’s
machine/transformation test. That is beyond the scope of this Article.
199
This issue should not be confused with the question of whether the written
description provides adequate support for the claims. See supra notes 33–35 and
accompanying text. That issue was whether the specification included sufficient
disclosure of the claimed invention. Here, the issue is whether the claims omit essential
elements of the invention.
200
134 F.3d 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
201
Id. at 1474; see also Matthew L. Goska, Of Omitted Elements and Overreaching
Inventions: The Principle of Gentry Gallery Should Not Be Discarded, 29 AIPLA Q.J.
471, 477 (2001) (“The Federal Circuit reversed because it was clear to the court that the
inventor considered the location of the recliner controls on the console to be an essential
198
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called this the “omitted element” or “essential element” test.202
Soon thereafter, the Federal Circuit stated that Gentry Gallery did
not create an “essential element” test.203 Instead, the Federal
Circuit characterized Gentry Gallery as merely holding that
“claims in an application which are broader than the applicant’s
disclosure are not allowable.”204 However, more recently in ICU
Medical, Inc. v. Alaris Medical Systems, Inc.,205 the Federal Circuit
appeared to apply the “essential element” test (without using that
label or referring to Gentry Gallery). The technology at issue
involved medical valves used in the transmission of fluids to or
from a medical patient.206 The specification described a spike that
was used to pierce a seal inside the valve.207 The defendant
successfully argued that the “spikeless” claims were invalid for
lack of a written description under 35 U.S.C. § 112 because the
specification limited the invention to valves with a spike.208 The
Federal Circuit agreed, stating that “based on the disclosure a
person of ordinary skill in the art would not understand the
inventor . . . to have invented a spikeless medical valve.”209 In
other words, the spikes were an essential part of the invention.

element of the invention. Therefore, by amending the claims during prosecution to
eliminate this essential element, the patent applicant improperly broadened the claims
beyond the original supporting disclosure. In other words, there was no written
description in the specification that taught or suggested moving the controls to places
other than the console. The broadened claims were thus held invalid for lack of written
description.” (footnotes omitted)).
202
See Goska, supra note 201, at 473; The Essential Element Test and ICU Medical,
PATENTLY-O (Mar. 18, 2009, 12:18 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/03/theomitted-element-test-and-icu-medical.html [hereinafter The Essential Element Test].
203
Cooper Cameron Corp. v. Kvaerner Oilfield Prods., Inc., 291 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed.
Cir. 2002) (“[W]e did not announce a new ‘essential element’ test mandating an inquiry
into what an inventor considers to be essential to his invention and requiring that the
claims incorporate those elements.”).
204
Reiffin v. Microsoft Corp., 214 F.3d 1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Newman, J.,
concurring) (quoting Application of Sus, 134 U.S.P.Q. 301, 310 (C.C.P.A. 1962)); see
also Johnson Worldwide Assocs. v. Zebco Corp., 175 F.3d 985, 993 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(holding that the court’s determination in Gentry Gallery was “premised on clear
statements in the written description that described the location of a claim element”).
205
558 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
206
Id. at 1372.
207
Id. at 1374–75.
208
Id. at 1377.
209
Id. at 1378.
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Thus, Dennis Crouch has questioned whether ICU Medical revives
the “essential elements” test.210
Despite the “essential element” test’s possible resurgence,
Matthew Goska suggested that one reason this test may not survive
is because it “contradicts prior case law [Aro] rejecting the idea of
a ‘gist’ of the invention.”211 Since the issue does not hinge upon
whether a particular item falls within the boundaries of a patented
invention, Aro should not stand in the way of the “essential
element” test. This does not mean that the analysis found in this
Article endorses the “essential elements” test here. It simply
means that the previous conventional wisdom about the heart of
the invention should not muddle our thinking on this topic.
Similarly, in the context of patent reform,212 one of the hotly
contested issues is damages,213 and one of the suggested reforms is
focusing on the essential elements of the invention to determine
patent damages.214 The proponents of this reform argue that
damages calculations should be based on the contribution that the
patented invention provides over the prior art.215 Since the issue
has nothing to do with whether a particular item falls within the
boundaries of a patented invention, this Article suggests that
opponents of this proposal who would mechanically rely on Aro
210

See The Essential Element Test, supra note 202 (comparing the analysis in ICU
Medical and Gentry Gallery).
211
Goska, supra note 201, at 497–98; see also id. at 500 (“The Supreme Court
previously held: ‘There is no legally recognizable or protected essential element, gist, or
heart of the invention in a combination patent.’” (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible
Top Replacement Co., 365 U.S. 336, 345 (1961))).
212
In 2009, there was proposed legislation regarding patent reform in both the House
and Senate. See, e.g., Patent Reform Act of 2009, S. 515, 111th Cong. (2009); Patent
Reform Act of 2009, H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. (2009). A similar bill was introduced in the
Senate in 2010. See Patent Reform Act of 2010: An Overview, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 8,
2010, 2:50 PM), http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/03/patent-reform-act-of-2010-anoverview.html.
213
See Patent Reform Act of 2009, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 3, 2009, 2:58 PM),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/03/patent-reform-act-of-2009.html
[hereinafter
Patent Reform Act of 2009].
214
IBM, TOWARDS AN EFFICIENT MARKET FOR INNOVATION 4–5 (2009),
http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/ipmarketplace/feb11/docs/munderweiser.pdf
(suggesting that looking at the “essential elements” of a patent “will focus the damages
determination on the value of what the inventor actually invented”).
215
See Patent Reform Act of 2009, supra note 213.
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are avoiding the real issues. Again, this is not an endorsement of
the “essential elements” proposal. It simply means that the debate
should focus on other more important issues and not be stopped by
a reflexive invocation of dogma.
Finally, in the context of enablement, the Federal Circuit has
recently relied on the “novel aspect of [the] invention” to show
lack of enablement.216 Patents are required to “enable” a person of
ordinary skill in the art to practice the claimed invention.217 Even
though a patentee is generally allowed to rely on the knowledge of
a person of ordinary skill in the art, in Automotive Technologies
International, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc.,218 the court said
that a “novel aspect of an invention must be enabled by the
patent.”219 Since enablement has nothing to do with whether a
particular item falls within the boundaries of a patented invention,
this Article suggests that the “all elements” rule does not apply and
considering the heart of the invention is permissible.220
In sum, Part III has demonstrated four points. First, it explains
how the “all elements” rule differs from the heart of the invention.
Second, it uses infringement, anticipation, obviousness, and
written description analyses to show that applying the “all
elements” rule makes sense in certain contexts. Third, it uses
contributory infringement, inequitable conduct, and joint
inventorship analyses to demonstrate that considering the heart of
the invention makes sense in other contexts. Finally, this Article
explains that determining whether to apply one doctrine or the
216

See Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1283 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
217
The statutory basis of the enablement requirement is found in § 112, which states
that the specification shall describe “the manner and process of making and using [the
invention], in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in
the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the
[invention].” 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
218
501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
219
Id. at 1283.
220
However, there may be other reasons against considering the heart of the invention.
In the case of enablement, the author has previously criticized the Automotive
Technologies decision for its reliance on the heart of the invention based on particular
goals of the enablement doctrine. See Bernard Chao, Rethinking Enablement in the
Predictable Arts: Fully Scoping the New Rule, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, ¶¶ 64–68,
http://stlr.stanford.edu/pdf/chao-rethinking-enablement.pdf.
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other depends on the nature and context of the question being
asked. If the question is whether something falls within the
boundaries protected by a patent, the “all elements” rule should
apply. However, they are many doctrines that ask different
questions. In those cases, courts should be free to consider the
heart of the invention as appropriate. Two other important
examples are the doctrine of repair and reconstruction discussed in
Part I, and the doctrine of patent exhaustion discussed in Part IV.
IV. RESUSCITATING THE HEART OF THE INVENTION
Patent exhaustion limits the patent rights that survive the initial
authorized sale of a patented item.221 The question that arose in
Quanta was whether exhaustion should only apply to the sale of
the entire patented invention or should also apply to the sale of
components that had to be combined with other components in
order to practice the patented methods.222 In other words, should
exhaustion apply to the sale of components that correspond to the
heart of the invention.
A. The Facts of Quanta
The plaintiff, LG Electronics, Inc. (“LGE”) had purchased
three patents.223 The three patents claimed specific technology for
managing different components found in a computer.224 LGE sued
Quanta Computer, Inc. (“Quanta”) for infringing the three LGE

221

Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2115 (2008) (“The
longstanding doctrine of patent exhaustion provides that the initial authorized sale of a
patented item terminates all patent rights to that item.”).
222
Id. at 2113.
223
Id. LGE’s three patents were U.S. Patent No. 4,939,641 (“the ’641 patent”), U.S.
Patent No. 5,379,379 (“the ’379 patent”), and U.S. Patent No. 5,077,733 (“the ’733
patent”). Id.
224
See id. The ’641 patent “discloses a system for ensuring that the most current data
are retrieved from main memory by monitoring data requests and updating main memory
from the cache when stale data are requested.” Id. The ’379 patent discloses an efficient
method of organizing read and write requests while maintaining accuracy by allowing the
computer to execute only read requests until it needs data for which there is an
outstanding write request. See id. “The ’733 patent addresses the problem of managing
the data traffic on a bus connecting two computer components, so that no one device
monopolizes the bus.” See id. at 2113–14.
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patents.225 Quanta was a group of companies that “manufactured
computers using Intel parts in combination with non-Intel memory
and buses in ways that practice the LGE patents.”226
In response to LGE’s complaint, Quanta raised the defense of
patent exhaustion.227 Quanta pointed to a license that LGE had
already granted Intel.228
The license permitted Intel to
manufacture and sell microprocessors and chipsets that use the
LGE patents.229 However, the license stated that
no license “is granted by either party hereto . . . to
any third party for the combination by a third party
of Licensed Products of either party with items,
components, or the like acquired . . . from sources
other than a party hereto, or for the use, import,
offer for sale or sale of such combination.”230
In two separate decisions, the district court granted summary
judgment to Quanta, finding that exhaustion applied to some but
not all of the patents’ claims.231 The district court reasoned that
“although the Intel products do not fully practice any of the patents
at issue, they have no reasonable non-infringing use and therefore
their authorized sale exhausted [LGE’s] patent rights.”232
However, the court found that exhaustion only applied “to
apparatus or composition-of-matter claims that describe a physical
object,” not to process or method claims that describe how to make
or use a product.233 As a practical matter, this was a victory for
LGE because a patent is infringed so long as any of its claims are
infringed.

225

Id. at 2114.
Id.
227
Id. at 2114–15.
228
Id.
229
Id. at 2114.
230
Id. (quoting Brief for Petitioners at 8, Quanta, 128 S. Ct. 2109 (2008) (No. 06-937))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
231
See id. at 2114–15.
232
Id. at 2115 (citing LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 65 U.S.P.Q.2d 1589,
1598–1600 (N.D. Cal. 2002)).
233
Id. (citing LG Elecs., Inc. v. Asustek Computer, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 2d 912, 918
(N.D. Cal. 2003)).
226
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The case was appealed. The Federal Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed with the district court and found that exhaustion did not
apply to method claims.234 However, the Federal Circuit disagreed
with the district court’s application of exhaustion. The Federal
Circuit held that exhaustion did not apply because the court did not
interpret the license to grant Intel the right to sell its products “to
Quanta for use in combination with non-Intel products.”235 The
Federal Circuit reasoned that since there was no authorized sale,
exhaustion could not apply.236 Quanta appealed this decision to
the Supreme Court.237
B. The Supreme Court’s Analysis
In an opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the Supreme Court
unanimously reversed the Federal Circuit and found that all of
LGE’s patent rights had been exhausted by LGE’s license to
Intel.238
After describing the historical roots of patent
exhaustion,239 the Supreme Court’s analysis was laid out in three
sections. First, based on both precedent and policy, the Supreme
Court held that exhaustion applied to method claims.240 Second,
the Supreme Court determined that Intel’s components
substantially embodied the LGE patents to trigger exhaustion.241
234

Id. (citing LG Elecs., Inc. v. Bizcom Elecs., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir.
2006)).
235
Id. (citing LG Elecs., 453 F.3d at 1370).
236
LG Elecs., 453 F.3d at 1370.
237
Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2115.
238
See id. at 2122.
239
See id. at 2115–17.
240
See id. at 2117–18. The Court reasoned that “[e]liminating exhaustion for method
patents would seriously undermine the exhaustion doctrine. Patentees seeking to avoid
patent exhaustion could simply draft their patent claims to describe a method rather than
an apparatus.” Id. at 2117. “By characterizing their claims as method instead of
apparatus claims, or including a method claim for the machine’s patented method of
performing its task, a patent drafter could shield practically any patented item from
exhaustion.” Id. at 2118.
241
See id. at 2118–21. The Court held that
the Intel Products constitute a material part of the patented invention
and all but completely practice the patent. Here . . . the incomplete
article substantially embodies the patent because the only step
necessary to practice the patent is the application of common
processes or the addition of standard parts. Everything inventive
about each patent is embodied in the Intel Products.
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Finally, the Court analyzed the license to Intel and determined that
there was an authorized sale to Quanta of licensed Intel
components that triggered exhaustion.242
This Article is only concerned with the second section because
it assesses whether patent exhaustion can be triggered by the sale
of an item that does not satisfy all the limitations of the claimed
invention.243 In resolving the issue, Quanta drew heavily on the
last Supreme Court decision that addressed exhaustion, United
States v. Univis Lens Co.244
In the Univis case, Univis Corporation (the “Corporation”)
owned patents on a particular type of eyeglass lens.245 It licensed a
related company, the Univis Lens Company, to manufacture and
sell lens blanks.246 In addition, the Corporation issued three other
types of licenses.247 The license to wholesalers authorized the
licensees to purchase the blanks, and finish them by grinding and
polishing.248 The license to finishing retailers allowed the
licensees to purchase blanks, finish them, and sell them to their
customers at prices set by the Corporation.249 The license to
prescription retailers granted them a license to buy and resell
finished lenses at a fixed price.250
The United States sued Univis for violations of the Sherman
Antitrust Act alleging unlawful restraints on trade.251 In response,
Univis asserted its patent monopoly rights as a defense to the
antitrust suit.252 Even though the Univis patents were only
Id. at 2120.
242
Id. at 2121–22. “Because Intel was authorized to sell its products to Quanta, the
doctrine of patent exhaustion prevents LGE from further asserting its patent rights with
respect to the patents substantially embodied by those products.” Id. at 2122.
243
See id. at 2118–21.
244
316 U.S. 241 (1942); see also Quanta, 128 S. Ct. at 2118–20 (discussing the Univis
case).
245
Univis, 316 U.S. at 243.
246
Id.
247
Id. at 244. The three licenses are to wholesalers, finishing retailers, and prescription
retailers. Id.
248
Id.
249
See id.
250
See id. at 245.
251
Id. at 242–43.
252
See id. at 243.
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practiced in part by the wholesalers and finishing retailers who
ground the blanks into lenses, the Supreme Court found that the
sale of the lens blanks exhausted the patent on the finished lens
because the lens blanks “embod[y] essential features” of the
patented invention and were destined to be “finished” in
“conformity to the patent.”253 As a result, the Supreme Court
affirmed an injunction suppressing the license contracts and
licensing system.254
In Quanta, the Supreme Court considered “the extent to which
a product must embody a patent in order to trigger exhaustion.”255
The Court noted that in Univis, patent rights had been exhausted by
the sale of an incomplete article.256 By “incomplete,” the Supreme
Court meant that the article satisfied some (but not all) of the
Thus, the Court
limitations of the patented invention.257
interpreted Univis to mean that the sale of an article that contained
a subset of the patent’s claims limitations could trigger patent
exhaustion.
The only question was how to determine when an “incomplete
article” sufficiently embodied a patent to trigger exhaustion. The
Quanta decision relied on two factors. First, the Supreme Court
said that “Univis held that ‘the authorized sale of an article which
is capable of use only in practicing the patent is a relinquishment

253

Id. at 250–51. The Court held that
[w]here one has sold an uncompleted article which, because it
embodies essential features of his patented invention, is within the
protection of his patent, and has destined the article to be finished by
the purchaser in conformity to the patent, he has sold his invention so
far as it is or may be embodied in that particular article. The reward
he was demanded and received is for the article and the invention
which it embodies and which his vendee is to practice upon it. He
has thus parted with his right to assert the patent monopoly with
respect to it and is no longer free to control the price at which it may
be sold either in its unfinished or finished form.

Id.
254

Id. at 254.
Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2118 (2008).
256
See id. at 2119 (“The lens blanks in Univis . . . were ‘without utility until [they were]
ground and polished as the finished lens of the patent.’” (alteration in original) (citing
Univis, 316 U.S. at 249)).
257
See id. at 2120.
255
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of the patent monopoly with respect to the article sold.’”258
Second, the Court pointed out that the “lens blank in Univis
embodie[d] essential features of [the] patented invention.”259 The
Supreme Court explained how the Intel components satisfied both
these criteria260 and concluded that they embodied the patents.261
Determining whether an incomplete article “embodies” a
patent is yet another way of asking if the article goes to the heart of
the invention. Thus, under Quanta, considering the heart of the
invention is critical to the doctrine of patent exhaustion. This
result is entirely consistent with the framework discussed in Part
III of this Article.
The doctrine of exhaustion does not ask if some item falls
within the boundaries defined by a patent. As a result, it should
not apply the “all elements” rule. Rather, patent exhaustion can be
thought of in the same vein as contributory infringement. For
contributory infringement, the question is whether someone can
avoid being charged with infringement by omitting a minor
limitation when selling a product. To prevent this tactic, § 271(c)
must apply the doctrine of contributory infringement to parties that
sell the heart of the invention. Similarly for exhaustion, the
question is whether companies can avoid the impact of the
exhaustion doctrine by omitting a minor limitation when selling
the product.262 To avoid this tactic, the Quanta Court properly
found that exhaustion applied to the sale of products that comprise
the essential features (i.e., the heart) of the invention.263

258

Id. at 2119 (citing Univis, 316 U.S. at 249).
Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (citing Univis, 316 U.S. at 250–51).
260
See id. at 2120–21 (noting that “[l]ike the Univis lens blanks, the Intel Products
constitute a material part of the patented invention and all but completely practice the
patent” and “[e]verything inventive about each patent is embodied in the Intel Products”).
261
Id. at 2121.
262
See id. at 2118 (“Quanta . . argues that exhaustion doctrine will be a dead letter
unless it is triggered by the sale of components that essentially, even if not completely,
embody an invention.”).
263
See id. at 2122 (“The authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a
patent exhausts the patent holder’s rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking
patent law to control postsale use of the article.”).
259
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C. Aro v. Quanta
Quanta’s decision to look at the “essential features” of an
invention in the context of patent exhaustion seems to be
inconsistent with Aro. However, the Supreme Court chose not to
address this tension directly. As might be expected, LGE relied on
Aro to argue that exhaustion should not apply to the sale of
products that form only part of a patented invention.264 LGE
argued that
Univis does not apply because the Intel Products are
analogous to individual elements of a combination
patent, and allowing sale of those components to
exhaust the patent would impermissibly “ascrib[e]
to one element of the patented combination the
status of the patented invention in itself.”265
The Supreme Court rejected that argument on two grounds.
First, the Court said that Aro was only concerned with whether the
replacement of a part of a patented combination constituted
infringement.266 Since the “replacement question” was not at issue
in Quanta, the Court implied (but did not say) that Aro was not
applicable.267 Second, the Supreme Court said that “Aro’s warning
that no element can be viewed as central to or equivalent to the
invention is specific to the context in which the combination itself
is the only inventive aspect of the patent.”268 However, this
passage shows that the Court does not fully appreciate the
significance of Aro. Aro was not simply recognizing that some
patents may not have an identifiable heart, like the Post-it note
discussed earlier. Aro said that the unpatented part of a
combination patent was not entitled to any protection regardless of
264

See id. at 2118–19.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement
Co., 365 U.S. 336, 344–45 (1961)).
266
Id. at 2121.
267
Id.
268
Id. The Supreme Court characterized this argument as “more important.” Id.
(“[M]ore importantly, Aro is not squarely applicable to the exhaustion of patents like the
LGE Patents that do not disclose a new combination of existing parts. Aro described
combination patents as ‘cover[ing] only the totality of the elements in the claim [so] that
no element, separately viewed, is within the grant.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Aro,
365 U.S. at 344)).
265
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how “worthy” or “essential” the part was to the invention269—that
is, even if one part did contain the inventive aspect of the patent.
By relying on these distinctions, the Supreme Court did not
have to discuss what role the heart of the invention should play in
patent law generally. Nor did it mention the numerous cases that
dogmatically repeat Aro’s commandment. Nonetheless, Quanta
can arguably be interpreted to limit Aro to the “replacement
question” and thus strike at the foundation of those cases that rely
on Aro outside the doctrine of repair and reconstruction. After
Quanta, the heart of the invention is considered in the context of
exhaustion. At the same time, Aro prevents it from being
considered under the doctrine of repair and reconstruction. But
now, Aro’s commandment does not preside over all of patent law.
Although Quanta did not overrule those cases that relied on Aro in
other doctrines, by limiting Aro, the Supreme Court wiped the slate
clean. The Federal Circuit is now free to explicitly acknowledge
that patent law recognizes the heart of the invention and look to
that factor in the appropriate contexts. Part III of this Article
explained how that choice should be made.
Of course this is not a totally satisfactory situation. The
Supreme Court should eventually resolve the tension between Aro
and Quanta. Why does the heart of the invention play an
important role in patent exhaustion, when it is not even “legally
recognize[ed]”270 for the purposes of repair and reconstruction?
And more fundamentally, should it? The answer is it should not
play a different role. For the reasons discussed in Part II, the heart
of the invention should be considered in the context of repair and
reconstruction. In view of Quanta, the time is ripe for the Supreme
Court to overrule that part of Aro as well.

269

Aro, 365 U.S. at 340 (‘“The fact that an unpatented part of a combination patent may
distinguish the invention does not draw to it the privileges of a patent. That may be done
only in the manner provided by law. However worthy it may be, however essential to the
patent, an unpatented part of a combination patent is no more entitled to monopolistic
protection than any other unpatented device.’” (quoting Mercoid II, 320 U.S. 680, 684
(1944))); see supra text accompanying note 136.
270
See supra text accompanying note 2.
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D. Addressing Criticisms of Quanta
Quanta has its critics. Most notably, Scott Kieff271 argues that
the Supreme Court has revived a previously discredited doctrine:
During the early 1900s, courts routinely focused on
which element of a patent claim was “key” or at the
“heart of the invention” to determine questions of
contributory infringement, induced infringement,
patent misuse, and antitrust. The inquiry was so
subjective that it became the plaything of the
judiciary, with most courts in the early part of that
period routinely ruling in favor of patentees on each
issue, while most courts in the later part of the
period routinely ruling against patentees. One of
the two central motivating factors behind the
congressional decision to promulgate the 1952
Patent Act—essentially our present patent statute—
was to statutorily jettison this entire line of cases
and create an objective framework for determining
patent infringement and valid patent licenses.272
Although Kieff’s description of the motivation underlying the
Patent Act of 1952 is generally correct, he arrives at the wrong
conclusion because he overlooks the specific problems the
legislation was intended to correct. Giles Rich,273 one of the
authors of the Patent Act of 1952, explained that section 271 was
271

Together Troy Paredes and F. Scott Kieff also filed an amicus brief in the Supreme
Court in Quanta arguing that exhaustion should not apply to the sale of Intel’s
processors. See generally Brief of Various Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Quanta, 128 S. Ct. 2109 (No. 06-937). The primary argument of the brief
and Kieff’s article is that the freedom to contract in these cases should take precedence
over the freedom from servitudes. See generally id.; Kieff, supra note 22. It is beyond
the scope of this Article to fully address this argument. But the author suggests that Kieff
and his colleagues’ argument proves too much. The freedom to contract argument really
attacks the entire doctrine of patent exhaustion, not whether exhaustion should apply to
parts whose only use is to form part of the patented invention. That discussion needs to
be left for another day.
272
Kieff, supra note 22, at 321.
273
Giles Rich later served as a Judge for the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and
the Federal Circuit. History of the Federal Judiciary, Rich, Giles Sutherland, FED. JUD.
CTR., http://www.fjc.gov/servlet/nGetInfo?jid=2002&cid=17&ctype=ac&instate=fc (last
visited June 15, 2010).

C03_CHAO_10-24-10_FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1236

10/24/2010 1:01 PM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 20:1183

enacted because “the courts [had] departed from the fundamental
principles underlying the patent system” in two waves.274 “[T]he
first excess was a period of undue expansion of contributory
infringement. The second period of excess . . . was the everexpanding doctrine of misuse of patents.”275 That second period
culminated in the Mercoid decisions which effectively interpreted
the doctrine of patent misuse to render contributory infringement
“entirely dead.”276 As described in Part II, the Patent Act of 1952
was a repudiation of the Mercoid decisions and thus their
underlying rationale—in other words, the refusal to recognize the
heart of the invention.277 Contrary to what Kieff argues, the Patent
Act of 1952 suggests that courts should focus on the “heart of the
invention.”
However, the concern underlying Kieff’s complaint is
understandable. It may be difficult to determine when certain
components constitute the “essential features” of a patented
invention.278 William Rooklidge, the former President of the
American Intellectual Property Law Association, and Mansi Shah
echo this concern and argue that identifying the “essential
elements” is “inherently subjective.”279 They also point out that
the Quanta decision failed to explain “how to separate the essential
from non-essential, what the inventor actually invented from what
she did not.”280
274

Rich, supra note 38, at 522.
Id.
276
Id. at 535–36.
277
See supra Part II.C.
278
See, e.g., In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Newman, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that there is a “delay, uncertainty and cost” associated with determining what
is “adequately central, or the significance of process steps” (internal quotation marks
omitted)), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
279
See generally William C. Rooklidge & Mansi H. Shah, Essential Features of the
Invention: Patent Damages Reform Dead End, INTELL. PROP. TODAY (Mar. 10, 2009),
http://www.iptoday.com/news-article.asp?id=3646&type=ip.
280
Id. (“The Quanta Court’s suggestion that essential elements are different from
‘application of common processes’ or ‘the addition of standard parts,’ ‘standard
components,’ or ‘common and noninventive’ steps suggests that the essential elements
analysis is similar if not identical to prior art subtraction. Not to put to fine a point on the
matter, the Quanta Court did not set out to identify what the inventor ‘really invented’
and has not identified a standard remotely useful in doing so.” (internal citations
omitted)).
275
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In fact, the Supreme Court analyzed a number of different
factors to determine that Intel’s products were “essential” to the
patented invention:
 “[T]he Intel Products constitute a material part
of the patented invention and all but completely
practice the patent.”281
 “Everything inventive about each patent is
embodied in the Intel Products.”282
 “The Intel Products were specifically designed
to function only when memory or buses are
attached.”283
 “Quanta was not required to make any creative
or inventive decision when it added [memory
and buses].”284
A review of these findings shows that the Court is engaged in
two distinct types of analysis. By using the terms “material part of
the patented invention” and “specifically designed,” the first and
third statements are applying a kind of contributory infringement
analysis.285 The second and fourth statements suggest that the
Court is applying a kind of patentability analysis.
The patentability analysis leads to the question of whether the
component has to be separately patentable to be essential. This
kind of analysis is dangerously complex. On a purely logistical
level, the inquiry asks the fact finder to determine whether a
hypothetical claim made up of a subset of claim limitations is
valid. Of course validity must be judged under both 35 U.S.C §
102 (anticipation) and § 103 (obviousness). The same question
may have to be repeated for various different possible
combinations of limitations. That could lead to multiple invalidity
presentations. This problem is magnified even further if several
claims are at issue. If the “inventiveness” issue is only one factor
in the entire “essential elements” calculus, this leads to the very
kind of unpredictability that worries the critics. Thus, the Quanta
281
282
283
284
285

Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109, 2120 (2008).
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 37 for the text of 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2006).
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standard has the potential to become the “flock of insignificant
standards” that concerned Justice Black in Aro.286
The lower courts can lessen this problem by focusing on a
contributory infringement analysis to determine whether a
component is “essential.”287 This standard is already recognized as
a test for determining when the heart of the invention is present.288
Under this analysis, a component of a patented invention would be
sufficiently essential to trigger exhaustion if the component: 1)
constituted a material part of the invention, 2) was especially made
or especially adapted for use in an infringement of the patent, and
3) was not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use.289 This is essentially the test for
contributory infringement without the intent requirement.290
The benefit of this standard is apparent. It avoids the critics’
complaint by setting forth a straightforward and objective standard.
There have been almost fifty years of case law interpreting §
271(c).291 Thus, courts should have no trouble applying it to the
issue of exhaustion. Moreover, the standard is also firmly rooted
in both the Quanta and Univis decisions. Therefore, the courts can
refine the standard in a sensible way now without having to wait
for another Supreme Court decision.
CONCLUSION
This Article argues that one of the basic foundations of patent
law should fall. For over half a century, courts and commentators
have said that there is no heart or gist of the invention in patent

286

See supra text accompanying notes 102–05.
This is really only a band-aid. Unfortunately, the best solution is probably
unrealistic. To create a clear standard, the Supreme Court should revisit Quanta and
repudiate its discussion of patentability as a factor in determining what are the essential
features of the invention.
288
See supra notes 37–43 and accompanying text.
289
See supra notes 37–43 and accompanying text.
290
The test for contributory infringement has a knowledge requirement. See supra note
37.
291
Of course, contributory infringement existed prior to the enactment of § 271 in
1952. See generally Rich, supra note 38, at 526–30 (referencing early contributory
infringement cases).
287
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law. However, by analyzing numerous different patent doctrines,
this Article has shown that the conventional wisdom is wrong in
many respects. Depending on the label that the particular doctrine
uses, the doctrine either relies on or rejects the heart of the
invention.
This Article reconciles this apparent inconsistency and
provides an analytical framework for determining when it is
appropriate to reject the heart of the invention and when it is not.
When the question is whether a particular product or process falls
within the scope of the patent, the heart of the invention is not an
appropriate consideration and the “all elements” rule should be
applied. For example, the doctrines of infringement, anticipation,
obviousness, and the written description requirement respectively
ask if an accused product, the prior art, or an embodiment from the
specification falls within the scope of a claim. In those contexts, it
is entirely appropriate to examine all the limitations together.
However, other doctrines including repair and reconstruction,
contributory infringement, inequitable conduct, and joint
inventorship ask different questions and sensibly focus on part of
the invention. In those cases, courts should be allowed to focus on
the heart of the invention.
This analysis has led to several recommendations. First, with
respect to the specific doctrine of repair and reconstruction, the
Supreme Court should overturn Aro and allow courts to consider
the heart of the invention in that context.
Second, considering the heart of the invention in the
developing areas of patentable subject matter, the “omitted
elements” test, and damages is entirely permissible and should
depend on the goals of each particular doctrine.
Third, this Article argues that the Supreme Court correctly
decided Quanta. Like contributory infringement, exhaustion
necessarily looks at what elements short of the entire patented
invention should trigger particular legal consequences.
Consequently, exhaustion properly considers the heart of the
invention. However, Quanta missed the mark. It used both
patentability and contributory infringement principles to assess
whether limitations are “essential.” The lower courts should focus
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the analysis on the contributory infringement prong which provides
a clearer standard.
In sum, the Supreme Court went too far when it issued Aro’s
commandment in 1961. Now that the Court has implicitly
recognized the significance of the heart of the invention in Quanta,
it is time to rethink all of Aro and explicitly recognize that the
heart of the invention has its place in patent law.

